1 



>1 



*t 



THE 



ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 



IN THE 



UNITED STATES 



A REVIEW OF THE EFFECTS OF THE CAUCUS SYSTEM 

UPON THE CIVIL SERVICE AND UPON THE 

PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES OF 

POLITICAL PARTIES 

BY 

d. c. McMillan 

WITH A PREFACE BY 

HON. HORATIO SEYMOUR 





NEW YORK 
G. P. PUTNAM'S SONS 

182 Fifth Avenue 
1880. 



r 






Copyright, 

1880, 

By G. P. Putnam's Sons. 



3^ 



TO 

JOHN J. LINSON, Esq., of Kingston, N. Y. 

THIS VOLUME IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED, BY HIS FRIEND, 

THE AUTHOR. 



PREFACE. 



The Author of this book has given a great deal 
of thought and study to our systems of election. 
He has set forth in a clear, full way the action of 
political parties and the degree to which they 
modify the theories of our government. His work 
can be read with profit by all who care to learn the 
actual workings of our systems of election. In do- 
ing his work he brings into view many facts in our 
political history. He also urges changes in our 
laws and Constitution which he' thinks will cure the 
mischiefs of which he speaks. With regard to his 
plan there will be differences of opinion. But if it 
should not meet with favor, in devising and stat- 
ing it, he puts the wrongs he would remedy in a 
strong light. The value of his book does not alone 
grow out of the wisdom of his scheme, but arises 
more from the recital of the evils he would cure, 
and his facts and reasonings about the theories of 
our government. I commend it to public attention 
as one that can be read with profit and interest. 

It will be of value even if it does not lead to any 

7 



8 PREFACE. 

changes in our laws ; for, while it proves how much 
is brought about by the activity and organization 
of a few, it also shows how large a share of public 
evils are chargeable to those who neglect their polit- 
ical duties. There is no small number who feel 
that close attention to their own affairs and utter 
neglect of their country's interests are meritorious. 
This class, in truth, are most guilty. As their indif- 
ference grows out of their ignorance of our political 
institutions, they, beyond all others, will be bene- 
fited by reading Mr. McMillan's work about the 
elective franchise in the United States. 

HORATIO SEYMOUR. 

Deerfield, September 23, 1879. 



NOTE. 



The first edition of this work was called out by a 
discussion, pending in Congress about two years 
ago, relating to the mode of electing President. 
Its matter was hastily prepared, and some defects 
may yet appear to the critical reader. They have 
been leniently passed over by public men and the 
public press, and, almost without exception, the 
views have received a hearty endorsement. 

The caucus, which it is sought to reconstruct, 
has the highest influence in the settlement of every 
public question, and a discussion of its relations to 
politics necessarily calls for a comprehensive review 
of political history. 

The independence now prevalent, the rebellion 
against caucus domination, the disruptions of par- 
ties, the disregard of conventional precedents of 
party organization, and the rise of new parties, are 
tokens of popular clamor for an avenue of escape 
from the monster characterized as " The Machine." 
They indicate the popular repugnance of the idea 
that the action of the caucus and convention is the 

9 



IO NOTE. 

action of the party. It is hoped that this examin- 
ation points in the direction of the remedy, and 
presents the means of reform at once the most 
conservative and natural. It does not propose to 
revolutionize the caucus. Recognizing the necessity 
for its existence, it aims to improve its mechanism 
by removing every obstacle which repels from its 
precincts the moderate, unbiased, and peaceful citi- 
zen, while affording an inducement to him by vest- 
ing his vote with a positive, and not an indirect, 
power in the councils of his party. By this means 
he may possess an equal influence with those, who, 
incited by the allurements of patronage, make party 
management a profession. 

The plan presented herein is intended to illus- 
trate the views and to indicate the method of re- 
form rather than for adoption. The most popular 
plan, briefly adverted to, is more in accord with the 
opinions of the author. But the first duty is to 
suggest the indispensable elements which must 
enter into a perfect system, leaving the outline to 
be filled by experienced statesmen and the wider 
range of vision of public assemblies. A power of 
selection by the masses of each party from among 
several candidates ; a legal nominating election at- 
tended by the members of all parties; and a final 
choice by an absolute majority, are requisites which 



NOTE. 1 1 

cannot be dispensed with without danger to the 
body politic. 

So far as is known, the methods proposed are the 
only ones which ensure the divorce of State and 
local frona-J^atiojial. politics, and bring every branch 
of government under the equal control of the peo- 
ple. Aside from the graver importance of local 
affairs, it seems absurd and unrepublican for hun- 
dreds of thousands of citizens to attend elections 
for State officers, when the contest has already been 
settled by the nominations of the convention of the 
leading party, whose only link of sympathy with 
the voter is their agreement upon national issues. 
If the application of these views should result in 
the establishment of evenly-matched parties in each 
State, based upon its internal issues, they present 
a solution of a question which for a century has 
baffled the most ambitious efforts of statesmen. 

A change has been made in the arrangement of 
the matter, and three new chapters, which did not 
appear in the first edition, have been added — one 
refers to third parties and their functions, another 
relates to the divorce of local and State from na- 
tional issues, and the third presents the proposed 
" Democratic system." 

Kingston, N. Y., October 22, 1879. 



CONTENTS 



PAGE 

Political Issues 15 

The Nature of Paramount Issues 23 

The Machinery of Political Parties 4 T 

The Influences surrounding Conventions 48 

The Primary and its Abuses 55 

The Influence of Patronage 68 

Civil Service Reform 77 

Third Parties and their Functions 87 

Government by the People 102 

Constitutional Amendments — Proposed Changes in 

The Plans Considered 119 

The True or Democratic System 127 

Local Issues 144 

The Divorce of Local from National Politics. 158 

Typical Political Rings 171 

The Methods of Rings 177 

The Proposed System and Democratic Principles 184 

Concluding Reflections 189 



THE 



ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 



UNITED STATES. 



CHAPTER I. 



POLITICAL ISSUES. 



The attempt to establish a system of free govern- 
ment on the western continent may now be examined 
in the light of the experience of a century. The 
union of the thirteen States was dictated, not alone by 
a sense of insecurity to the blandishments of foreign 
intrigue, but by a remembrance of the heroic struggle 
in which all had united to secure the blessings of 
political independence and individual freedom. Con- 
federated during the war by devices less consistent 
with national energy than the sovereignty of the 
States, the desirability of union was conceded by all. 

Four thousand years had elapsed before a free 
government was thought possible in a widely extended 

i5 



1 6 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

territory. To the statesmen who framed our Constitu- 
tion belongs the honor of first attempting the experi- 
ment by the extended application of the principle of 
representation. They erected a government suited to 
a wide territory, to an increasing population, and 
adapted to the varying needs of the material interests 
of citizens. The very vagueness of the Constitution, 
in which the powers conferred are described in general 
language, contributed to these ends. 

In tracing the history of the Republic, the stu- 
dent must be satisfied that States' Rights were 
viewed in the Federal convention from a standpoint 
very different from that in which the subject is now 
examined. The circumstances under which the union 
was formed and the debates of the convention will 
also present convincing evidence of a wide variance 
between the expectations of the founders of the gov- 
ernment and the developments of experience. They 
cannot be scanned without discovering a jealous regard 
for the sovereignty of the States, as the controlling 
spirit of its councils. Every incident bearing upon 
the subject would seem to point to the assumption 
that, in the new confederation, the states, possessing 
the highest sovereignty, would exercise authority more 
important to their fellow-citizens than that conferred 
upon the nation. Its members had before them facts 
then existing. Before the union each State was a 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 7 

separate and independent government, and to the 
majority of its citizens was accorded the exercise of 
power. Within each were existing factions or parties 
around which grouped the political classes into which 
the masses will ever divide ; and no fact would lead 
them to suppose that the new Constitution would 
change the centre of political thought or alter the 
allegiance of the citizen. Under the Articles of Confed- 
eration, the will of the people was concentrated within 
the limits of each State, and uttered by the indepen- 
dent agency of State authority in the councils of the 
nation in which each commonwealth was entitled to 
an equal vote. The existence of great national parties 
seems not to have been expected. 

Confirmation of this view is afforded by the Con- 
stitution itself. The careful regard to State represen- 
tation in the Senate and House of Representatives ; 
the structure of the Electoral College and the provision 
that the electors should meet within their respective 
States, point to the assumption. The jealousies of the 
States are evidenced on every page of the records. 
The small States feared the great ones, and the body 
was on the point of dissolution while discussing their 
equal representation in the legislative branch of the 
proposed union. 

The existence of slavery was a characteristic which 
distinguished the Southern commonwealths from their 



1 8 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

Northern brethren. It was the one great interest 
not common to every portion of the union ; and had 
the transfer of popular allegiance, following the exercise 
of the sovereign authority, from the States to the 
nation, been anticipated, the erection of the national 
government would never have been consented to by the 
South. It brought within the control of its enemies 
the institution of slavery. A brief period only elapsed, 
before wise statesmen saw with dismay that the new 
government which included within its domain the 
staid Puritan and the sensitive Southerner, sooner or 
later, would be disturbed by a violent conflict. 

Thus was left unsettled the vital question of political 
sovereignty, and a union of doubtful sovereignty was 
acquiesced in, as the only one which would meet with 
acceptance in every section. 

Once formed the union exhibited a characteristic 
which seems never to have been alluded to in the 
convention. The nature of the powers conferred upon 
the general government, which though few in number, 
were of a most important character, led to the concen- 
tration of public attention to the nation at large. 
The distinctive interests of classes of people began to 
appear, and saw in the government of the union an 
enemy or a benefactor. States' Rights became then 
a principle of a class of believers, not a thing to be 
asserted as a reserved power by a single community. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 



J 9 



The thousand industries which had formerly looked 
to the respective States, as the possessors of sovereign 
power, for assistance or protection, now fastened their 
eyes on the union clothed with the authority of regu- 
lating commerce, and representing its relations to 
foreign production. The manufacturer saw his in- 
terests affected in every adjustment of the tariff, and 
demanded protection. The producer sought for a free 
commerce. The creditor wanted hard money and the 
debtor a flexible currency. 

These interests, diverse as they are, were common 
to the people of all the States of the union, and rep- 
resented the wants of living flesh and blood. New 
formations resulted. The States, no longer sover- 
eigns, were degraded into units, each of which was 
powerless when arrayed against his neighbors. The 
centre of attention and authority was transferred to 
the halls of Congress, and upon its floors the interests 
of the people, differing in shades, began to combine 
into congenial associations. A majority was necessary 
to control ; one less than a majority, in the legislative 
branch, was as inefficient as a hundred ; and combi- 
nations became a necessity. Two political parties 
were the result of the compromise of these influences, 
and since the foundation of the government to the 
present time, they have divided the sentiments and 
the votes of the people. 



20 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

Immediately after the adjournment of the conven- 
tion the contest between the advocates of State and 
national sovereignty broke out with violence, and 
the arena of debate was transferred to every portion 
of the union. The incomplete character of the struc- 
ture was exhibited by the wide divergence of views 
expressed on the one hand by those who had sought 
to establish a Constitution suited to the needs of a 
nation, and, on the other, by those who wished to 
avail themselves of the mantle of State sovereignty to 
protect a " peculiar institution." * The violence of 
discussion which had aroused the most threatening 
forebodings in the convention, from the formation of 
the union until the deep passions were aroused to 
open warfare, disturbed the tranquillity of the masses. 

In another view, the framers of the government 
were equally mistaken, and to this day the erroneous 
impression exists in the public mind. It was assumed 
that in the selection of officials the people would de- 
vote their attention chiefly to the personal qualities of 
candidates for their favor and judge aspirants for leg- 

* Mr. Baldwin, of Georgia, a member of the Federal Con- 
vention, stated in the House of Representatives, Febuary 12th, 
1790, that the subject of slavery caused pain and difficulty in 
the Convention, and the members from the South consented to 
union only because of an extreme desire to obtain an efficient 
government. Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, said the States 
never would have consented unless their property had been 
guaranteed to them. Debates of Congress, vol. i. pages 209-210. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 21 

islative or executive offices by those merits which 
elicit popular respect. Honesty and capacity, first of 
all, it was supposed would be sought for. To ensure 
the selection of these qualities as attributes of the 
chief magistrate of the nation, and at the same time 
to make that office independent of legislative power, 
the founders confided his election to an indepen- 
dent body. In the Federalist, contained in a chapter 
written by Alexander Hamilton, we find these words 
with reference to the purpose of the electoral col- 
lege :— 

" The mode of appointment of chief magistrate is 
almost the only part of the system of any consequence, 
which has escaped without severe censure from its oppo- 
nents. It was desirable that the immediate election 
should be made by men most capable of analyzing the 
qualities adapted to the station, and acting under cir- 
cumstances favorable to deliberation and to a judicious 
combination of all the reasons and inducements which 
were proper to govern their choice. A small number 
of persons selected by their fellow-citizens from the 
general mass will be most likely to possess the infor- 
mation and discernment requisite to such complicated 
investigations." 

Such were the expectations of the ablest advocates 
of the Constitution with regard to the electoral sys- 
tem. How different is theory from practice ! Politi- 
cal organizations have usurped its functions, and have 
devolved upon their instrumentalities the " discern- 
ment " and "intelligence " needed for such " compli- 



2 2 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

cated investigations," while the electors have become 
silent automatons to execute their will. 

The agency which contributed in the highest degree 
to change the character of the government was the 
growing influence of the people which accompanied the 
extension of the elective franchise. Under the Con- 
stitution the electors were to be chosen by the state 
legislatures. The college was a body invested, not 
only with the power of election, but that of selection ; 
and so long as the legislatures elected its members, it 
acted with some degree of independence. Gradually, 
however, their power was surrendered, State after 
State making the sacrifice to the growing influence 
of the masses, until in 1824, the electors in a majority 
of the commonwealths of the union were chosen by 
the people.* The people were vested with full capacity 
to make a final choice, but as a selecting agency they 
were impotent. Instrumentalities hitherto unknown 
were the resort to enable them to perform both func- 
tions which were embodied in the electoral college. 
The operation of the system, based upon facts existing 
no longer, on several occasions, has threatened the per- 
petuity of the union, and brought the people to the 
threshold of civil war. The electoral college was di- 
vested of its deliberative character the moment when 

* In Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, South Caro- 
lina and Vermont, the Legislatures chose the electors. 



IN THE UNITED STATES 23 

deliberation was rendered unnecessary by the exercise 
of the power of selection by another authority. It 
was finally supplanted by agencies unknown to the 
lav/. 

A brief examination of the principles urged by 
political parties and their tendencies will serve to ex- 
hibit the nature of the responsible functions of govern- 
ment. 

THE NATURE OF PARAMOUNT ISSUES. 

We have alluded to the discovery by citizens living 
in one State, of interests which bound them to the 
inhabitants of every other locality in the union— in- 
terests, national in their character, and mostly relating 
to the commercial transactions in which every adult 
is constantly engaged. The general authority to regu- 
late these affairs is reposed in Congress, the legislative 
branch of government. Laws, " the rules of action 
of citizens," are universal in their operation. All 
other powers are obedient to the body which enacts 
them. The executive, the only other active branch, 
is the servant and agent of Congress to execute its 
decrees. Within the limits of the highest law, the 
Constitution, established by themselves, the people in 
their national relations have reposed in Congress the 
supreme authority of making all laws to protect and 
control all their interests. 



24 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

Out of the exercise of these powers arises the bulk 
of the issues submitted for popular determination. 
The requirement that a majority shall concur to enable 
it to control legislation, forces a coalition of a class 
having common national sentiments into combinations 
with other classes with views least repugnant to their 
own to such an extent as to possess the reasonable 
hope of having that majority. Without that hope, 
combination is feeble and ineffective. All classes out- 
side of such a combination represent the opposite 
force, with which it disputes the authority of govern- 
ment. 

The legislative power touches a thousand questions, 
each of which presents an issue, which is discussed in 
Congress. Ability and discretion are required to ex- 
amine and comprehend their details. If they were 
submitted to the people, a thousand elections would 
be necessary, at each of which the masses would vote 
yea or nay. But our system permits of but one elec- 
tion every two years for members of the legislative 
branch of government, and each year one election in 
a portion of the States. 

Hence, the many questions are grouped together, 
and only the general principles which underlie them 
are presented for popular approbation or disapproval, 
and the political party friendly to the administration 
votes yea, while the one opposed votes nay. Those 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 2 $ 

who do not act with either, throw away their ballots, 
and substantially vote blanks. 

In a general sense, one political party represents the 
Radical or progressive classes of sentiment ; the other, 
the Conservative. One wants statute law; the other 
insists upon the supremacy of natural law, or the un- 
restrained inclinations of citizens. Law being a rule 
of action which every one must follow, it restrains 
that portion of the people whose habits or inclinations 
would lead them to do what it forbids. These classes 
are ordinarily found in the resisting or Conservative 
party — the party opposed to new enactments. A cer- 
tain degree of comprehension is required to under- 
stand the purpose of new laws, and most of those who 
possess it are found in the organization which claims 
to be progressive. Intelligence and riches increase 
wants, and the classes whose wants or desires, which 
can be satisfied by government, are greatest, are found 
in the Radical forces ; and, as the want is satisfied, 
the issue changes. That organization is, therefore, 
constantly presenting new issues and undergoing new 
transformations ; the other, representing the masses 
who have no special interest to gratify, and whose 
liberty is affected by the touch of the law, remains 
the same, lives always, and contains substantially the 
same elements. In it is found the foreigner, who, 
bringing his customs into a new country, discovers 



26 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

that its laws interfere with their enjoyment. He finds 
the most congenial association with those who advo- 
cate the least law. The Radical believer discovers 
right from the appearance of abstract questions, while 
the thoughtful Conservative examines issues in their 
relations to the circumstances which surround them. 

The grouping together of questions into general 
principles, confines the people to a choice between 
the two classes of principles most prominent ; and a 
description of them discovers, first, their entire har- 
mony with each other, and their intimate relations to 
the most important interests of mankind — commerce 
and liberty. 

We write only of standard issues. Slavery was a 
special issue, arising from circumstances which exist- 
ed temporarily, and it was the course of nature which 
made the Radical forces the advocates of the law for 
its extermination, and the Conservatives, the resisting 
agents. Commerce always exists, and government 
always requires taxes, which commerce and production 
must pay. The difference in methods of procuring 
taxes and controlling commercial transactions, is, 
therefore, a subject of constant agitation. 

The Conservative party, representing the non-inter- 
ference view of political economy, wants a money 
whose intrinsic value renders unnecessary legislative 
interference to vitalize it ; it wants a commerce, free 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 



2/ 



from legislative restrictions ; it opposes sumptuary 
laws ; it demands that the Constitution which confers 
powers upon government shall have a strict construc- 
tion so as to limit the extent of power exercised. The 
effect of these principles is to extend liberty by re- 
straining law. It is on one side of that happy mean 
which makes the law the preserver of liberty, by re- 
stricting and restraining passions to that extent which 
permits of the highest enjoyment of happiness, free 
from tyranny on the one hand and anarchy on the 
other — thereby securing the largest degree of true 
liberty. The extreme of Radicalism, is unlicensed 
tyranny ; of Conservatism unlicensed liberty. Both 
are equally destructive of real liberty. 

The other party represents a special policy, and 
groups together special interests. It claims that the 
greatest degree of prosperity accorded to these in- 
terests, will inure to the greatest advantage of all. 
Mr. Clay initiated the protective policy for the manu- 
facturing interest, and internal improvements for the 
producing class. The National Bank, which aimed 
to cure financial ills by the issue of an artificial cur- 
rency, found its strongest defenders among the Whigs. 
The Republican party represented the sense of the 
people in the moral question of slavery, and now tends 
to the adoption of Whig principles upon the perma- 
nent issues. 



28 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

There were other questions which, in the early days 
of the Republic, naturally took precedence. They 
related to the liberty of citizens, and to the reposi- 
tories to which that liberty should be confided. The 
Federalists aimed to extend the power and strengthen 
the arm of the general government. The Democratic 
or Conservative party sought to strengthen the States 
as the best bulwarks of popular liberty. As it wished 
to preserve the greatest degree of liberty to the peo- 
ple, so it sought to repose many important powers 
which were necessary to government, in those agen- 
cies which were nearest to the people. 

These, then, are the general policies and principles 
which are presented for the public decision. The at- 
tention of the citizen cannot be fastened upon any 
less important issues, and there are none more impor- 
tant No special State interest can be considered by 
a national party ; and a division of sentiment within 
a State upon its local questions, would impair the 
strength and integrity of the national organization. 
A party that attempted to father the special interests 
of a State, would soon destroy itself. To enable it to 
cope for national power, the national organization 
deals exclusively with national questions, and State 
organizations are only parts of the structure by which 
it is sustained. 

State, and even municipal elections, in the main, 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 29 

do not exhibit the strength of certain local or State 
policies or interests, but the views of citizens upon 
national questions. Although the policies to be follow- 
ed by the mayor are different from those of the gov- 
ernor, and those of president differ from those of 
either, at the same election, no appreciable difference 
appears in the number of votes which the candidate 
for each of these offices receives, when sustained by 
the same party organization.* Either the local or 
national issues are subordinated. The votes for all 
being the same the controlling attention is attracted 
by the one class of questions referred to. State 
Conventions seldom waste paper to record an opinion 
on State policy ; and when an election is held in any 
State, the people throughout the union look to it as 
an indication of public opinion upon some recent 
legislation discussed in the halls of Congress. Even 
the results of local elections are examined with refer- 
ence to their bearing in this direction. 

We reach the conclusion, then, that the people sub- 
ordinate every other question to those of a national 
character, and, so far as their ballots are concerned, 
they only decide upon the general principles under- 
lying purely party policies. 

* In New York State, where the vote for Hayes for Pres- 
ident was 489,207, and Morgan, for Governor, 489,371, the differ- 
ence (if any) in the issues involved seems to have been under- 
stood by very few voters. 



3° THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

The questions are presented in the vague resolu- 
tions of National or State party Conventions; but 
under the declarations may be discovered the distinc- 
tive tendencies which we have discussed. How, then, 
do the people decide upon the issues submitted ? 

Not from a thorough comprehension of the details 
of the policies, either undertaken or promised, nor 
even a reasonable comprehension of the principles an- 
nounced. The laws or principles are so varied in their 
character, and extensive in their operation, that they 
puzzle the deepest and most philosophical student of 
political economy. The citizen, therefore, if inde- 
pendent in his judgment, will decide from the appa- 
rent effects of policies ; if sturdy in his political faith, 
he is valuable as an automaton to jump at the beck of 
his party leaders, and useless for anything else in the 
political drama. He gets his politics from his party 
as the Russian gets his religion from the Czar, or the 
Brahma from his priest. Yet there are ten of this 
kind to one of the other ; and Tweeds rise and fall, 
heaping curses on their heads in the shape of debts. 
Powerless or disinclined to do otherwise, the party 
man votes from habit, without variation, to sustain 
his party. The changes in the margins between 
the strength of a political organization from one elec- 
tion to another, frequently represent the number of 
those who, under the stress of hard times, attributing 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 3! 

their misfortunes to the policy of government, burst 
asunder their party trammels and demand a reform. 

These changes represent, in the period intervening 
between one presidential election and another, scarce- 
ly enough to make a balance of power in the most 
closely contested states. During the half century 
between 1824 and 1870, out of 185 elections held in 
States, at which they voted, for president, only 15 
times have been witnessed a variation from their na- 
tural party predilections. These changes were con- 
fined in each instance to States where majorities were 
insignificant. The elections in the Northern States 
during and since the war exhibit with even more dis- 
tinctness the certainty of partisan success in every 
State where majorities exceed three per cent of the 
total vote. Notwithstanding the changes in the is- 
sues presented, the Democratic party have been 
successful, at presidential elections, through a period 
of nearly twenty years, only in the States of New 
York, New Jersey, Indiana and Connecticut — in each 
of which the majority for either party has seldom ex- 
ceeded the margin mentioned. 

The sole privilege exercised by the citizen in his 
direct relation as a factor influencing the action of his 
government is that performed in exercising the fran- 
chise. The only instrument which makes him an ac- 
tive agent in the government is the ballot, and the 



3 2 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

exact limit of his expression by its use, the purposes 
to which it can be devoted, and the circumstances 
which control or restrain its power, are subjects de- 
manding the most careful attention. 

Forced by the limited opportunity which our pres- 
ent system of elections affords to bestow his atten- 
tion upon national issues alone, the conclusion is 
irresistible that whatever effective expression is en- 
sured to the citizen upon questions relating to State 
and local policies, must be had through the only other 
agency through which his voice is exerted, the ma- 
chinery of political organizations wherein he speaks 
as a member of the leading party. The organiza- 
tion which controls a State, a city, a county or even a 
town, where certainty of success is ensured by the 
large political preponderance in its favor, not only 
nominates but elects. In States it chooses governors 
and legislators, and in smaller localities, all officials 
vested with the functions imposed by law upon them. 

From these considerations it is apparent that an 
individual receives his political character only from his 
association with a force co-extensive with the borders 
of the nation, and that parties are responsible only so 
far as they speak with reference to subjects of uni- 
versal interest. Yet it may be safely declared that 
not one-twentieth of the legislation of Congress is of 
this nature. The bulk of enactments relate to 



IN THE UNITED STATES. $$ 

private or local interests. Unity of action is had 
.only when those opinions conforming to the natural 
and universal tendencies of the constituency which 
a party represents are to be advanced, and cannot 
properly be demanded upon questions in which 
those principles, interests, or tendencies are not in- 
volved. Though division may result in defeat, local- 
ities, whose temporary advantage may be subserved 
by a brief departure from permanent principles, will 
not be slow to rebel. 

Having, then, examined those issues in refer- 
ence to which parties may appropriately represent 
the convictions of voters, and as to which officials per- 
form responsible functions, it remains to touch upon 
those relations of a subordinate character, substan- 
tially unaffected by the results of elections. In regard 
to these, officials are invested with despotic, or per- 
haps more properly, with a discretionary authority, 
and government is practically irresponsible. The ex- 
ercise of power is unrestrained by the influence of 
the popular will expressed at the ballot box. To as- 
certain the distinction more clearly, we will summarize 
the conditions upon which responsibility depends : — 

The essential of responsibility is that the power to 
appoint and remove shall be in the people. Upon the 
ready adaptability of the appointing agency to apply 
itself to the particular duties of the official whose acts 



34 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

are to be investigated, and the readiness with which 
the power of removal is exercised, depends all there 
is of accountability in government. An executive 
having this authority over his subordinates, capable 
of giving proper attention to the manner in which 
they have performed their duties, possessed of a mind 
which readily applies itself to the legitimate subjects 
of consideration, and acting wholly with reference to 
them, presents a perfect picture of responsibility. Not 
so, however, with the mass of people compelled to 
speak by the lips of a majority. 

Party responsibility demands that a political organ- 
ization shall represent well defined purposes or prin- 
ciples, clearly distinguishable from those advanced by 
the opposite party. Usually, the national platforms, 
however they may recognize the same wants of the 
people, differ as to the means or remedies to be adopt- 
ed to supply them. In this difference will be dis- 
closed the tendencies of the organization, whether 
towards a Conservative or Radical policy ; and the 
platforms of each may be usually interpreted by strip- 
ping from them all glittering generalities alluding to 
the need of public virtue and public justice and as- 
suming that the means proposed to remedy a given 
state of affairs will be followed in the event of suc- 
cess. 

To ensure party responsibility the issues presented 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 35 

should be appropriate to the affairs which are to be 
managed by the officials to be chosen. Hence, the 
discussion of national affairs and the relations that 
voters bear to them, are unimportant and ought to 
have no place, under a proper system of elections, in 
a State or local canvass ; but the decision should turn 
upon those questions having intimate connection with 
the concerns immediately involved. Where no diver- 
gence of views exists which distinguish one party from 
another, upon such issues, there can be no responsi- 
bility. That questions of this character are discussed, 
that party lines are drawn upon them, in State and 
local elections, no one will have the temerity to urge ; 
and hence the decision of a State, like the verdict of a 
jury given on immaterial issues, is taken upon ques- 
tions of national policy. 

To afford this responsibility it is necessary that the 
people of a given community or State should be able to 
decide the contest for its power or authority with ref- 
erence to issues legitimately involved. Majorities can- 
not now be transferred on these questions ; the people 
lack the elastic movement which enables the attention 
of all to be attracted to them, excluding all extra- 
neous issues. It is not the gain or loss, but the 
majority investing acceptable hands, with the govern- 
ment which speaks effectually. Where the affairs of 
States follow those of the government and are passed 



36 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

into the control of those whose only known opinions 
or policies have reference to the conduct of national 
authority, responsibility in States is a myth. In Iowa, 
where the strength of Republicans is double that of 
Democrats, or in Kentucky or New York city, where 
the condition of affairs is reversed, such a thing must 
be unknown at elections ; and the voice of the people 
upon local policies is unheard. The body politic, 
speaking as a whole, in such States, ever exerts its 
voice in the same direttfon. The even balance of 
parties, which is a result of adapting issues to meet 
the wants of the public in such a manner as to afford 
the hope of victory to each of the contesting organiza- 
tions, is lacking, and in closely contested States, elec- 
cions turn upon Congressional policy. Until parties 
are formed with reference to local issues, partisan 
responsibility, will not be realized. 

The machinery of political organizations arose out 
of chaos. The law provides no method of nominat- 
ing public officials, and to fill the stations of gov- 
ernment it was necessary that some agency should 
name candidates. In the early days of our history, 
the Congressmen, in caucus assembled, presented 
the candidates for President, and being themselves, 
to a certain degree, responsible to the people, usu- 
ally followed the sentiment of their political sup- 
porters. The small local officials were selected by 
mass meetings or conventions. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. $j 

The law only provided that certain offices should be 
filled, and the method of filling them was left entirely 
to popular impulse. By means of political machin- 
ery, the sentiment of two millions of citizens, com- 
posing one of the political parties of the country, is 
supposed to be concentrated in the will of the few 
hundred who happen to be members of a national con- 
vention. With reference to the prevailing issues to 
which that sentiment is attracted, doubtless the will 
of the masses is in a measure respected ; but, with ref- 
erence to the questions subordinated, the influences 
which surround these bodies lead to the substitution 
of the wishes of the individuals composing them. 

The power of political conventions is practically 
the power of the government. The successful party 
selects the Executive, who appoints all the officials of 
the nation, directly or through his agents, except the 
few composing its legislature. It names the issues 
and policy of the government. Its will is supreme 
within the limitations of constitutional authority, and 
frequently it is emboldened to overstep those bounds. 

The fixed partisan majorities in twenty-nine States 
of the Union enable the influences which control 
political conventions within them to possess as abso- 
lute a power over the government and the people as if 
no elections were held. No issues are discussed or 
passed upon by the masses, within the limits of the 



38 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

State, and the management of their domestic affairs is. 
therefore, without restriction, confided to these agencies 
and the elements which control them. The nomina- 
tion of the Democratic party in Georgia, or the Re- 
publican party in Maine, renders certain the control 
of the State ; and when it is secured, elections, 
with all their expensive paraphernalia, are useless for 
any purpose having reference to the internal conduct 
of the affairs of the State. 

It is, then, through these agencies that the corrupt 
influences which are exhibited in the movements of 
the government gain their foothold in the Nation, 
State and local municipalities. It is through this me- 
dium that the purse of the people and the resources 
of the country are surrendered. It is by these agen- 
cies that personal power is established, for the contest 
within them has reference to personal rather than 
political differences. It is the man who is chosen at 
the caucus and convention, and the principle which is 
adopted at the election. The qualifications of hon- 
esty, fidelity and capacity are taken, by compulsory 
circumstances, from the people, and remitted to these 
bodies ; and every advocate or participant in dishonest 
schemes seeking the bounty of government, rushes to 
this point to enforce the selection of those who pos- 
sess the companionable qualities which will ensure 
the gratification of his wishes. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 39 

From these reflections and from the experience 
of the country it will be discovered : 

First, That the people at the election 
have no control over an immense range of 
affairs relating to the management of the 
government as to which an equal interest 
is not felt in every section of the country. 

Second, Where, as in the case of election 
OF MEMBERS of congress, state and local 
officers, one party largely outnumbers the 
other, the whole function of election is 
merged in and performed by the nominating 
convention of the leading party, and thf 
only votes which affect the control of the 
government are cast by the supporters of 

THAT PARTY WITHIN ITS PRIMARIES. The election 
is a mere matter of form, a process of ratification of 
the act of the convention, and the minority by 
attending do nothing to affect the general result. 

The vast majority of elections come within the 
second class mentioned. Out of two hundred and 
ninety Congressmen elected, scarcely fifty are chosen 
from districts in which parties are evenly matched. 
A change in the partisan complexion of the House 
of Representatives of fifty would be a most remark- 
able one. The rule applies with equal force to 
local and State elections. 



40 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE / 

We have endeavored to show that the ballot can- 
not reach the official vested with power, in the 
exercise of discretionary authority. Its power is 
limited to enforcing general principles, and does 
not affect a large array of less important duties. 
The proper exercise of this discretionary power can 
be ensured only by the selection of personal quali- 1 
ties of honesty and integrity, suited to resist the 
pressure of corrupt influences. They are involved ! 
solely in the personality of the individual, and are 
subjects for which the person, and not the party, 
can be held to responsibility. The caucuses and 
conventions present or select the candidate. The 
selection of the candidate is the selection of his 
qualities ; and so far as those qualities become a 
reliance of the people to protect them from misgov- 
ernment, or from corrupt influences, they must be 
ensured through the machinery of parties. The 
action of a convention of a political party at once 
closes the discussion upon this point, so far as the 
party is concerned ; and when the same methods of 
selection are employed by each organization, and 
the same influences prevail in each, the questions of 
honesty and capacity are finally settled at a period 
anterior to any exercise of the public will, through 
the employment of the ballot at the election. 



THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE" 



41 



CHAPTER II. 

THE MACHINERY OF POLITICAL PARTIES. 

The political machinery of parties has one legitimate 
purpose. Good government requires the selection for 
public positions of officials possessed of the qualities of 
honesty and competency of the highest possible order. 
Whatever may be the divergencies of views in respect 
to questions of principle or policy, the selfish interest 
of every citizen demands these qualities as the best 
safeguards of society. The relation of the citizen to 
his government is that of agent to principal ; his voice 
is expressed at elections and the majority ascertained 
presents the aggregate personage dictating the move- 
ment of the wheels of government. It is alive and 
active as to national issues ; it is dormant and dead 
as to personal qualities and local policies. If the 
body politic does not enforce its demand for political 
honesty, it is not because the people are forgetful of 
the importance of that quality, but because the means 
of expression are inadequate. Corruption, in all its 
forms addresses itself to the individual, and the 
qualities of mind essential to resist its insidious attacks, 
are to be found in personal character. The effect of 



42 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

policies is seen ; corruption is frequently secret and 
unseen. A party may be punished for evil effects 
resulting from mistaken policy, but the personal quali- 
ties of candidates, mingled with issues of great impor- 
tance, cannot control the action of voters, especially 
when viewed only through the glasses of heated parti- 
sanship. Practically, nothing is believed against the 
character of the nominee of one's own party. 

The agencies, then, which select the candidate, 
also elect him so far as his personal characteristics 
and his capacity to resist corrupt influences, are con- 
cerned. While the candidate may not be wilfully cor- 
rupt, he cannot avoid a feeling of responsibility to the 
powers and elements which control these organisms. 
He must submit to some of their wishes, or the 
promise of future advancement is lost. In those 
matters, in which the elements controlling political 
machinery have the largest interest, he will act as 
their agent or suffer their displeasure. 

Two men are presented by these agencies. The 
force of circumstances compels a choice between 
them. The distinctive tendencies of parties cannot 
be represented by the candidates unless they are 
competent. Party convictions can form no basis for 
public favor unless candidates understand the princi- 
ples they profess. A partisan contest is meaningless 
as between ignorant men. So with honesty. No reli- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 



43 



ance can be placed upon the professions of men unless 
their integrity gives assurance that they will do as 
they promise. 

Hence, parties, through their machinery, are bound 
to furnish intelligent and honest agents to apply their 
professed principles to the government ; and to the 
adaptability of conventions to ensure that end, let us 
give our attention. 

These bodies are agents of the political party they 
represent. Each individual within them is the agent 
of his constituency. The nature of that constituency 
we will leave to be inferred from our discussion of the 
structure of political primaries. In this relation of 
agent to principal one word in the language is more 
expressive than any other. That word is responsibility. 
It indicates in our government the only hold the 
people have upon their public servants. Without it 
representation is impossible. 

If in the course of our reasoning it shall be demon- 
strated that there intervenes agencies which assume 
the important function of nominating all officials ; that 
in them the masses of the people have no representa- 
tion of their honest instincts, no further explanation 
of the presence of corruption will be needed. 

That scheme which sought to reflect the public will 
in an extensive territory, and rendered possible the 
government of the union, will prove an ignominous 



44 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

failure where representation is not associated in every 
instance with responsibility. In appearance, every 
official is responsible to the people ; the spirit of re- 
sponsibility is written on every line of the Constitu- 
tion of the States and Nation. The executive is 
elected by and is responsible to the people ; and every 
official he appoints is responsible to him. In fact, 
however, executive responsibility extends just so far 
and no farther than the machinery of elections per- 
mits of his selection by the people as the agent to exe- 
cute the policy which party or public sentiment 
enforces. That portion which elevates him as dis- 
tinguished from his party associates is the caucus and 
convention, and to the agencies which control them 
he is primarily responsible. As he could hope for 
no re-election without their assistance, his personal 
responsibility to the people is limited to the amount 
of public . sentiment which is filtered through the 
poisonous channels of the machinery of political or- 
ganizations. 

The measure of representation in the selection of 
the qualities of honor secured to the people depends, 
first, upon the influence they possess at the primaries ; 
and, second, upon the responsibility to which conven- 
tions are held to the caucus assemblies. Responsi- 
bility is of a' double nature, as stated. A convention 
may be responsible for its action to the elements which 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 



45 



elect it, speaking as a whole ; and the individuals com- 
posing it are responsible just in proportion as the 
part they perform is known to the constituency 
which selects them. The responsibility of individual 
members in all legislative bodies, is sought to be se- 
cured by compelling a record of yeas and nays upon 
the passage of bills ; the individual responsibility of 
the executive is assured by the publicity of his appoint- 
ments and the nature of his duties. When an im- 
proper nomination is made, a division of responsibility 
among all who compose a convention, weakens its 
force ; and where nothing serves to indicate the ac- 
tion of an individual delegate, each is as independent 
of control by those whom he represents, as he would 
be if he exercised his despotic functions for a lifetime 
unsubjected to any restraint upon his own inclinations. 
In nearly every convention, national, State, city or 
town, the votes of individual delegates in the selection 
of candidates are veiled by a secret ballot. Not 
knowing for whom its representative voted, whether 
for an upright or dishonest candidate, no constitu- 
ency can hold him to judgment. Frequent instances 
have occurred where delegates have been purchased in 
advance by a corrupt candidate whose nomination has 
been frustrated only by an open ballot. The stigma, 
lasting for a lifetime, attaching to the action of every 

delegate who voted for such a candidate, was sufficient 

5 



46 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

to overcome the influence of money. The publicity 
of the dishonest vote ensured the publicity of the 
bargain which secured it. 

Responsibility cannot exist without publicity. Here- 
in the political machinery, performing functions far 
more important and vital than those performed by the 
people at the polls, loses sight of that principle which 
is the corner stone of representative government. With 
it, goes the power to reward or punish ; without it, 
the power of removal and the principle of accounta- 
bility which render the lesser agent the reflection of 
the will of his superior, would be a nullity and a 
farce. 

The influence of responsible administration may be 
illustrated by the methods of executive action. The 
chief magistrate selects a cabinet of persons whose 
qualities and sentiments are congenial to his own ; 
and they in turn appoint the thousand subordinates 
to carry out the executive policy. Whatever may 
be the requirements of that policy the agents are per- 
fectly obedient to their chiefs, knowing that removal 
follows a failure to respect them. The effects of the 
action of the central power is felt in every section of 
the country. Even the sentiments of the servants 
accord with those of the master. When President 
Johnson exercised the power of removal which, for a 
short time, he possessed, most remarkable conversions 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 47 

followed among the office-holders in the land ; and 
when, afterwards, the senate assumed the control of 
patronage, the backward movement was quite as 
spontaneous. 

There are other characteristics of political conven- 
tions which unsuit them to perform the legitimate 
functions of their establishment The smallness of 
the number usually composing them, invites the pres- 
sence of bribery, and the haste of their action denies 
opportunity for consideration of the vast matters 
which are at stake within them. When the legislature 
considers a charter for a city, or votes a small appro- 
priation for an individual, a discussion of the justice, 
the equity and the purpose of the act exhibits it in all 
its bearings. Conventions, performing a duty which 
reacts almost vitally upon vast industries and whose 
influence is of a most lasting and impressive character, 
seldom bestow more than a few hours' discussion upon 
the subject which called them together. The absence 
of compensation to delegates, also invites bribery ; 
for compensation marks clearly the line of honest 
value for service, and leaves no room for quibbling 
about the moral distinctions which distinguish right 
from wrong by the merest shades. The cost of travel- 
ling, and the expense of lodging are important to each 
delegate ; and the acceptance of their value, while it 
seems less repugnant than the taking of an open 



48 TEE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

bribe, breaks down a barrier of honest independence 
which serves to divide the pathway of duty, from 
the roadway of corruption. 

Let us, then, array this small number of individuals, 
irresponsible to the people, performing their functions 
at their own expense and in the most hasty manner, 
in the presence of those influences, whose very life 
depends upon the results of their action. 

THE INFLUENCES SURROUNDING CONVENTIONS. 

The element primarily interested in the action of a 
convention is the office-holding and office-seeking 
class. A knowledge of the antecedents of the mem- 
bers of a National Convention would disclose that a 
large proportion were either participants in official 
favors, or expectant of them. Many persons attend 
these gatherings for the purpose of establishing their 
claim to office, and are therefore ready to barter their 
votes for pledges. In the absence of compensation, 
as human nature is, in times when some ulterior motive 
is sought to explain even the most patriotic action, it 
is difficult to find any adequate influence which would 
prompt a citizen to go thousands of miles to attend a 
political convention. Many, doubtless, for the honor 
of the position, are impelled to accept the trust of 
delegate, but a large proportion will be found to have 
a more selfish and controlling motive. The recent 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 49 

conventions which nominated candidates for the 
presidency, were attended by many thousand officials 
feeding on government bread ; and one was encircled 
by car loads of people from the slums of leading cities 
of the Union. The vast majority of the persons pres- 
ent were political workers, whose labors had been 
rewarded by positions of trust ranging from weighers 
in a custom-house to governors of a State, from 
city aldermen to United States senator. 

The control of political patronage is usually con- 
fided to the senator from a State. Whether this 
results from an implied arrangement between the 
executive and the senator by which one is to nomi- 
nate and the other to confirm, is a question which will 
not be discussed. The senator distributes his favors 
among the respective members of Congress, and there- 
by each is possessed of more or less personal power 
which can be devoted to political uses. We hear of 
Sherman controlling appointments in Ohio ; Conk- 
ling in New York ; Blaine in Maine ; Cameron in 
Pennsylvania, and the so-called carpet-bag senators 
distributing the Federal offices in the South. In gen- 
eral, the members of the highest legislative branch 
have had the largest influence in distributing political 
patronage, and those of the House have controlled it 
in a lesser degree. It is seldom that persons not in 
government positions are consulted. It is gratifying 



50 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

to know that the present administration is attempting 
a reform in this direction, and if successful, it will do 
much towards elevating the independence of both 
branches of the legislature of the nation. Past expe- 
rience has filled the public mind with misgiving, as a 
reform of this kind means a contest with the legisla- 
tive department — a power capable of crippling any 
executive and of enforcing any demafod. 

Concentrated upon a political convention, a share of 
whose members are already under obligations to an 
administration, what a power must be exercised by 
eighty thousand officials, in the United States. With 
a single exception the eight or ten candidates for the 
presidency mentioned in the most recent convention 
of one party, were holding Federal offices ; and at the 
convention of the opposing organization each person 
competing for the nomination, by virtue of his office 
as governor, controlled the patronage of his State. 

These are not all the elements interested in the 
selection of persons suited to their purposes for official 
stations. Other combinations with far greater mo- 
tives are as directly affected by the action of conven- 
tions. In the selection of president they feel much 
solicitation. The possession of the veto power enables 
that officer to defeat corrupt legislation, by speaking 
with the force equivalent to two-thirds of the legisla- 
tive members. They want not office, but lands ; not 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 



51 



patronage, but credit, to assist monopolizing enter- 
prises. In elections they are interested in the politi- 
cal principles of the candidate ; in the conventions, 
as to their personal characteristics which involve the 
question of pliability. If the nominee is opposed to 
government subsidies, he will meet with their vigilant 
and bitter animosity ; if the candidate presented to 
the convention is honest and straightforward, he is cer- 
tain to suffer their displeasure. The extent and influ- 
ence of these agencies is measured only by the 
capital of the industries of the nation ; and the 
ready means of combination are furnished by the elec- 
tric telegraph. No locality possessed of a manufac- 
tory, whose interests are affected by law, fails to feel 
the effect of its influence in political affairs ; and it is 
not difficult to discover that the proportion of delegates 
whom these agencies consent to send to conventions 
is large enough to form an efficient power to protect 
their interests. The ordinary citizen has no such 
inducement ; he cannot spare the expense of an ex- 
tended trip, and his interests, considered individually, 
are not sufficient to attract him from the every-day 
concerns of his life. 

The special interests of leading railroad magnates 
who possess the control of a few large corporations 
chiefly find expression within the doors of a national 
convention ; and their influence is dependent upon the 



5* 



THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 



opportunity which the structure affords for secret ac- 
tion and the instability of the character of the mem- 
bers composing the body. The corrupting tendencies 
of monopolized power were exposed a few years ago 
by the discovery of the Credit-Mobilier stock in the 
hands of leading members of Congress. 

Within the States the influences which are inter- 
ested in the action of conventions are of the same na- 
ture. These agents holding office, expectant of office, 
and those comprising the elements interested in State 
legislation are always found within these bodies. The 
insurance companies, the gas companies, the railroad 
companies, the canal and Tammany Rings, are ever 
present by their representatives at every State con- 
vention held in the State of New York. The entrance 
of these influences in the legislatures of States fill 
them with ready tools, who assume the reins of lead- 
ership, and with innocent nobodies follow the course 
laid out by their intellectual superiors. 

It is seldom that these agencies are loud in their 
manifestations at conventions. The office-holders take 
the precedence, and seem to be the impelling agents. 
The monopolized interests furnish the means with 
which campaigns are conducted, and are " the power 
behind the throne." Arrayed against them even 
eighty thousand office-holders would be insufficient ; 
compromising with them, their combined forces give 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 53 

the senator or representative who will accept it, a 
power in the State or nation, which, if exercised 
through the channels of political machinery, becomes 
as absolute as that of a despot. They form the foun- 
dations upon which rests the personal power of those 
who are willing to become the automatons of cor- 
porate monopolists in the distribution of legislative 
favors. 

The records of legislation divulge alike the purpose 
of these monopolists and the ease of its accomplish- 
ment. Direct bribery, a process most dangerous and 
difficult, would be the only resort in controlling legis- 
lation, if the members of the legislative branch of 
government were not amenable to the influences which 
control political machinery. Bribery is relieved of 
its sting, but is not lessened in its malicious effects, 
when it appeals to the ambition of the legislator ; and 
those effects are apparent in recent history of congres- 
sional action. The grant in ten years time of 200,- 
000,000 of acres of public domain, with bills pending 
three years ago, for more than is left ; and a tariff 
conferring a revenue scarcely forty per cent of its 
cost in enhanced values to consumers, leave no lack 
of indications to denote the method of paying for 
value received. 

Their power is also exercised in the political pri- 
maries. It is here that the influence of a few men. 



54 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

combined together, may nip in the bud the aspirations 
of candidates, for herein is the starting-point in the 
race for political favor. 

It is needless to discuss the question whether agen- 
cies so open to the entrance of these powerful combi- 
nations, which in themselves or by their agents could 
hardly present at the polls two hundred thousand 
votes, are suited to represent the wish of five millions 
of electors whose general interest depends upon the 
possession by officials of the highest qualities of na- 
ture. 

The right of these interests to that protection which 
their capital or numbers demands will not be disputed. 
In the abuse of this right the evil consists. Class leg- 
islation, though it may be wrong in principle, is not 
necessarily dishonest ; but we insist that a system 
which permits individuals, comparatively few in num- 
ber, by means which, whether directly or indirectly 
corrupt, are necessarily vicious and immoral, is one 
dangerous in its consequences, not alone to public 
morality, but as well to public liberty. 

In uneven States the arts of bribery have no em- 
ployment at elections that are without significance, 
but will exhibit themselves in every form at the State 
convention of the leading party. In lesser localities, 
where the possibility of overturning a considerable 
majority appears, it becomes the resort of the weaker 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 55 

organization, while candidates of the stronger dispense 
their promises and gifts upon their political friends 
who may influence the action of the political conven- 
tion. All the agencies, then, which in closely con- 
tested States are employed to influence the popular 
will at elections, in those States where nomination 
means an election, are concentrated to control the ac- 
tion of the body that makes it. 

THE PRIMARY AND ITS ABUSES. 

The first stage in the process of nomination is the 
appointment of a delegate to a political convention. 
He is chosen at a meeting of citizens. This meeting, 
in theory attended by residents or voters of a small 
locality like an election district, is called a primary. 
When in former times the candidates for lesser offices 
were nominated directly by mass meetings, as the 
meetings were usually controlled by the residents of 
the sections in which they were held, the principle of 
representation was applied. Candidates were selected 
by delegates chosen from all the townships or wards 
within the boundaries over which the official was to 
serve. 

These primaries are not legal establishments, but 
have their origin in common consent. The manner 
of holding them differs in various localities, but in 
general no safeguards to ensure fairness are placed 



56 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

# 

about them. They are conducted without much re- 
gard to formality or decorum, and as a rule rather 
than the exception, "everything is fair" within them, 
corrupt or dishonest influences exert a controlling 
sway. 

Their functions would be of the most important 
character if the delegate selected within them was 
responsible. As it is, they are the only agencies in 
which the people exert any influence whatever, in 
the selection of candidates. Where the majority of a 
political party is fixed in any State or locality, prac- 
tically the vote of citizens to be of the slightest ef- 
fect must be cast here ; and it is the only place where- 
in the qualifications of candidates, relating to their 
honesty, fidelity and capability, can be considered. 
As a part of the machinery performing the functions 
alluded to, these meetings have a most important 
bearing upon the political condition of the State or 
nation. 

The law prescribes the formalities of action which 
ensure the peaceable conduct of elections. Law it- 
self is formality. Parliamentary law secures the con- 
venient transaction of the business of deliberative as- 
semblies. Both are intended to prevent the will of 
the few from controlling the will of the many. Neither 
of these classes of law are known at political pri- 
maries, and everything depends upon the character of 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 57 

the persons composing such gatherings. If a small 
clique can set up its will, and by fair or unfair means, 
control them, there is nothing in any law relating to 
these assemblies to prevent it. 

As primaries are in every respect like elections, 
except that the latter are conducted in accordance 
with the formalities of the law, we may look within 
them for those classes of evils which the law forbids 
at elections. 

First, there is established at elections a Board of 
Inspectors to preside over them. Full authority to 
maintain regularity and order, to enforce obedience 
to their lawful commands, to preserve peace and 
good order around the polls, and to keep access there- 
to open and unobstructed, is possessed by these of- 
ficers. They may call upon the sheriff or constable, 
or, in his absence, may deputize any other citizen to 
take a person refusing to obey their commands into 
custody. It is needless to say that in the absence of 
any authorized body of this character, the primaries 
are conducted usually in the utmost disorder. The 
inspectors are clothed with other powers at elections 
to enforce authority and to protect the peaceable cit- 
izen in the exercise of his rights. They must pro- 
vide ballot-boxes of a particular kind, deposit ballots 
in a particular way, keep poll lists, challenge voters, 
count the ballots and declare the result in a formal 



58 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

manner, and are punishable if they fail to perform 
their duties as the law requires. 

Penalties are enacted to punish for illegal voting 
by convicts, for false swearing, and to punish the in- 
spector for permitting illegal voting. For influen- 
cing or disturbing voters, for providing or paying for 
entertainments, for furnishing money for attendance 
of voters, for deceiving voters as to their ballots, for 
obstructing the polls, for non-residents of the district 
or State voting, for voting more than once, for procur- 
ing illegal voting, and for illegal voting generally, 
penalties are prescribed. These provisions, though 
not observed with the utmost strictness, in all cases, 
go far towards attaining the objects sought, and exert 
a temporizing influence upon the unlawful elements. 
They, in the absence of these requirements, have 
full sway at the primaries. 

The abuses which prevail to the greatest extent in 
the primaries are the voting by non-residents, repeat- 
ing or voting more than once, and voting by minors. 
We are not aware that any guard exists to prevent 
the voting of the female sex, and the advocates of 
woman's rights may find therein an open field for the 
exercise of the franchise in a manner more effective 
than it could be employed at elections. There are 
fortunately few convicts, and therefore few abuses by 
them. At elections few illegal votes are cast by non- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 59 

residents of the election districts, while at primaries 
in cities they form on an average nearly one-fourth 
of those who participate. Voting more than once is 
of frequent occurrence ; and the reason more votes 
are not duplicated and more non-residents are not im- 
ported, arises from the fact that they cannot be had in 
time, or that success has been already assured. 

How useless it is to discuss the question of fairness 
at the primaries ! The facts are plain upon their state- 
ment, and the results secured at elections present with 
equal clearness the remedy. The leading political 
authority on New York primaries declared it impossible 
to conduct primary elections fairly in that city, an 
opinion which was most emphatically concured in 
by his antagonist, Mr. Morrissey. 

Another abuse of a most important nature exists 
which the provisions of the law to which we have 
alluded do not apply and cannot prevent. It is the 
attending by the voters of one political party at the 
caucuses or primaries held under the auspices of 
their opponents. No one knows the political convic- 
tions or intentions of a voter but himself, and unless 
he is prominent in politics, it would be useless to pre- 
vent his voting whenever and wherever he pleases. 
Thus he may attend every political caucus of every 
organization, and experience has demonstrated that 
there is a class of men who by doing this control 



60 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

primaries and elect delegates of one organization in 
the interest of a Ring whose chieftain may be a 
shining light in the opposing party. In the city, 
where the writer resides, at the most recent primary 
assemblies, in five out of the nine wards, more votes 
were cast at the primary elections of one party than 
there were voters in the wards, notwithstanding the 
fact that one half of the genuine electors of the party 
did not attend them at all. 

These institutions, for we cannot consider them por- 
tions of a system without shocking a sense of propriety, 
also afford an opportunity for the exhibitions of the 
inventive genius of roguery. There are tricks in the 
trade of politics as well as others ; and when a snap 
judgment is taken by the election by acclamation of 
sets of delegates, and prompt adjournments follow at 
the precise hour without reference to the correctness 
of the time-pieces, the result is as completely accom- 
plished by five persons as it could be by five hundred. 
In most cities and counties, no tribunal whatever is 
established to decide upon contests of delegates or the 
fairness of primary elections. 

It is the only organization of individuals which has 
no rules for its government, and those composing it 
are usually the most ready to abuse the rights of 
others. The village debating club proceeds in its 
business guided by some of the principles of parlia- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 6l 

mentary law ; every corporation follows the lines of 
the statute, and conforms the details of its action to 
the requirements of its constitution and by-laws. 
Here, the only authority is that of physical force, and 
a few rioters are of more value than five times their 
number of peaceable citizens, for their voting is unre- 
stricted, while the inoffensive attendant may be driven 
away. Bribery, which is most indispensable at the 
point where the question is one purely of personal 
supremacy, is influential at the primary. The statute 
is absurd which says to the candidate who has pur- 
chased a nomination, equivalent to an election, that he 
must not use his money at the election polls. 

Such, then, are the evils of informality which ex- 
hibit themselves at the primaries. We have feebly 
described their nature. Their effects are apparent to 
every citizen. The absence of formality is an invita- 
tion to mercenary influences, to the power of brute 
force, and the greedy instincts of selfishness to enter 
the precincts of the caucus. In this place they enthrone 
themselves. The respectable citizen discovers their 
presence, and, unguarded in his rights, is compelled to 
abandon these assemblies. Engaged in the ordinary 
avocations of commerce, he has not the talent or op- 
portunity to study the chicanery practised therein, 
nor has he the inclination or hardihood to brave the 

voice of ruffianism. If he deigns to step within the 

6 



62 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

caucus, he is a silent and unobtrusive spectator, and 
he leaves it determined to select the best of two men, 
the fruit of the same agencies. It is useless to ask 
good citizens to brave the compact force of organization. 
It offers to them an impossible task. 

How is it with the candidate ? The employment 
of bribery in its varied forms, ruffianism and 
riot are essentials to success. Through these agen- 
cies, he must use the tools or forget his aspira- 
tions. Using them, he can no longer respect himself, 
for he commits a violation of the moral law. Need 
we be surprised, therefore, that a scheme of fraud 
involving hundreds of millions of dollars are enacted 
into law by the nearly unanimous voice of the legisla 
tors of the empire State ; that not a member of one 
political party was found to protest against the selec- 
tion of a speaker whose conversion was the work of 
an hour between the meeting of the assembly and the 
time for the election of that officer ; that fraud is 
synonymous with politics, and that vast organizations 
uphold by their strength corrupt men on the pinnacles 
of political power. 

The wording of calls for political primaries are false- 
hoods upon their face. They invite all citizens and 
repel all who deserve the name. Limited in their lan- 
guage to office-holders and all interested in the dis- 
tribution of political favors, they would justify the 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 63 

attendance of nearly all who, in fact, lend their pres- 
ence to these gatherings. 

A caucus in its purpose is an election. The human 
mind can conceive of no election which, in its essen- 
tial aspects, is not a fair one. An unfair election is a 
misnomer. When unfairly conducted it is a species 
of jugglery, and loses its vital attribute as an expres- 
sion of the popular will. To all who have thought 
upon this subject, such must seem this portion of the 
machinery of political parties. Immoral in the extreme, 
it is fraught with danger to the body politic. 

We have before us a volume. It contains over one 
hundred and fifty pages of carefully worded specifica- 
tions which seem necessary to ensure fairness at elec- 
tions. In this book of the election laws of New York 
State are minute directions to inspectors, full state- 
ments of the rights of citizens, and penalties for their 
violation. Recent experience has demonstrated that 
these enactments hardly suffice to ensure honest elec- 
tions where the contest is less of personal than of 
political interest. If the subject of controversy was 
of purely a personal character — where the interests 
of men, separated from that of party, were involved 
— the task of securing a fair adjustment of the purely 
selfish desires would be more difficult. 

A wise legislation would make the penalties more 
stringent, the definitions of duties more careful, and 



64 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

the guards against bribery more scrutinizing. An ex- 
act description of the qualifications of voters, a care- 
ful surveillance over the primary to the end that those 
possessed of the right, and only those may vote, and 
provisions for the exact record of votes cast, ought 
to be ensured. 

A foreigner examining our institutions would be 
amazed at the absence of these provisions to secure 
fairness of expression at the only place where the re- 
sponsibility of candidates is to be secured, so far as 
their personal qualities are involved ; and he would 
not be surprised that every scheme of trickery, un- 
forbidden by the law, should compete for advantage 
and success. 

No laws exist defining the qualifications of voters. 
Hence, all who claim the right and who possess the 
physical prowess to enforce it, may vote. 

The sober suggestion to every observer of political 
primaries, is that they are open to every improper in- 
fluence, which utterly destroys their utility for the 
purposes they ought to subserve ; that, the moral law 
being the only criterion of the action of those in- 
terested, the candidate who obeys it is certain of de- 
feat by the man whom it does not restrain, and who, 
by illegal advantages, may double his forces ; that the 
presumption against every candidate who succeeds is 
that he did so by the employment of the means which, 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 65 

if not corrupt, are at least unfair — particularly in cities ; 
and that they are disreputable gatherings from which 
reputable men ought to and do absent themselves, 
though it divests them of all the influence they pos- 
sess as free citizens. 

To assert that such a system is imperfect is a 
waste of words. The contest in each community 
resolves itself into a fight between small factions 
seeking the control of political spoils. The merits 
and demerits of candidates are obscured in the 
clouds of the battle between two leaders of oppos- 
ing factions, whose delegates bear their respective 
standards. The question is that of neighborhood 
supremacy. The money contributed by the candi- 
date to assist one of the contending forces secures 
the control of the delegate, who is secretly pledged 
to the interests of the candidate, though his name 
may not be mentioned in the fray. 

The intelligent citizen looking beyond the dele- 
gate, and desiring the selection of a proper agent as 
the bearer of the standard of his party, must feel 
himself disfranchised at discovering the result of 
political jugglery. He has voted for a faction in 
which he has no interest ; for a candidate to him 
unknown ; and contributed to the success of a local 
leader with whose aspirations he has no sympathy. 
His voice might as well have been left unexpressed. 



66 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

In this manner the power, which ought to be divid- 
ed between the hundred who attend the caucus, is 
centralized into the hands of a single person. At 
the convention the delegate finds himself confront- 
ed by agencies, small in number but powerful in 
influence, and adept in intrigue. The control of a 
State rests in the common consent of a few men 
identified with public affairs in the various counties. 
The test of political strength in each instance has 
little relation to the merits of candidates, but de- 
pends almost solely upon the strength of the leaders 
and their hired supporters. 

The demands of those invested with political 
power in each county, spurred on by the cravings 
of a hundred men anxious for a share of the public 
spoil, opens to the view the whole catalogue of 
official criminality and extravagance. With the 
personal influence of leaders depending upon the 
amount of patronage at their disposal, they become 
the constant solicitors at the doors of public offices. 
Temptations beset the incumbent at every side. His 
fears are addressed by threats, and the thought of 
personal obligation appeals to his impulses of friend- 
ship. The public treasury furnishes the ample means 
of reciprocating favors without cost to himself, and 
his ambition prompts to add to the number of his 
adherents by granting the wishes of the suppliants. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 67 

Local defalcations, useless public improvements 
made at the public cost, and public debts crushing 
private industries, bear witness of the cost of this 
system, in which the purchase of the few is the best 
assurance of power. The personal expenses of can- 
didates, and the favors distributed as perquisites of 
the government, amply explain the vast increase in 
the number of place-holders, and afford a commen- 
tary upon the power of the agencies with which the 
Republic must deal in the battle for its salvation. 

The favors openly sought by corporations from 
legislatures, free passes almost universally accepted 
by judges from railroad companies upon whose af- 
fairs they are called to pass judgment, and the lob- 
bies besieging the legislative halls, are the necessary 
consequences of the operation of these influences 
upon local and national politics. 



68 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

CHAPTER III. 

THE INFLUENCE OF PATRONAGE. 

We have discovered, then, that personal power 
exists without personal responsibility. Individuals by 
the use of appropriate means secure the control of the 
machinery of party. Controlling it, they are foisted 
into political power by the fact of a partisan majority 
already existing, and the force of a popular current 
attracted to issues which obscure the character and 
designs of the candidates. Once in possession of the 
government, with the law to assist in seizing upon its 
boundless resources, the capacity to increase the per- 
sonal power is limited only by the taxable property 
of the people. Bestowed upon middlemen, whether 
contractor or senator, the unity of interest and the 
appreciation of the gift, are readily felt, and the grate- 
ful impulses of higher functionaries are generated in 
the minds of office-holders and laborers, who alike be- 
come the participants in the bounty of common bene 
factors. 

The effects resulting from the employment of the 
present system of political machinery upon public 
honesty have been examined. It remains to consider 
them in their relations to the political integrity of the 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 69 

party organizations. The principles of Democracy or 
Conservatism may be applied to the government of 
every community, and belief in their justice constitutes 
a man a Democrat. They spring from a common root, 
and all harmonize with the one idea that the least gov- 
ernment consistent with public safety, will secure the 
greatest degree of public happiness. All other parties 
aim to ensure public safety by strengthening the arm 
of central authority. The fears and wants of one 
class, which seeks for an increase of comforts, whose 
enjoyment requires the fullest protection, find ex- 
pression in the sense of the Radical party ; while the 
fears and wants of the other, seeking the fullest 
liberty, are aroused by every invasion of it by the 
law. These underlying principles, universal in their 
operation upon the human mind, identify with cer- 
tainty the political character of every individual in the 
land — a character altered only by changes of circum- 
stances of individual life, which brings with them new 
wants and other fears. The method of elections which 
secures the most certain expression of the popular 
will, tends to attract the eyes of all to a contemplation 
of harmonizing principles, which when assuming the 
form of law will accomplish the results seeming most 
desirable to each individual. Is economy desir- 
able ? The plain road is in the application of 
those consistent principles which limiting the power 



70 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

of government limits as well its expense. Is equality 
desirable ? The avoidance of all legislation which 
makes a distinction of classes ; which tends to foster 
one industry at the expense of others ; and the estab- 
lishment of system of general legislation in the place 
of special enactments. A perfect system of elections 
would afford the expression of the wants and fears of 
each individual, upon every important subject, local 
or national ; and constant discussion would early dis- 
close the capacity of a* few principles to satisfy his 
wants, as well as their entire harmony with each other 
in their tendency to fulfil the wish of a given class. 

Men are born equal. The mind of all is the 
same. The characteristics which mark the intellec- 
tual capacities of individuals are the same. Passion, 
affection, reason, intellect are the gifts of every being 
possessing the image of God, and these faculties form 
the world of mind, upon which principles act, with the 
same effect as upon individuals. The circumstances 
of every-day life rouse the passions, animosities and 
prejudices of individuals ; the circumstances surround- 
ing the heavy tread of national progress call forth the 
passions of nations which find expression in the 
tumult of wars. Principles are alike the foundation 
of human conduct and national action ; upholding the 
superstructure of law within which they move. The 
self-interest or common interest of all is the highest 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 7 1 

conception of justice ; and the voluntary expression, 
by each individual of his own wants, afforded through 
the best instrumentalities, is the surest means of its 
attainment. Declared by the will of the majority, be- 
hind it stands the physical force needed to assert its 
dignity. Clothed with the power of law, it forms a 
resistless agency. The despot seizing the machinery 
of government, makes his own will the law, and forces 
it upon discontented or rebellious subjects. The Re- 
publican citizen represented in the law becomes his 
own constituency. 

Right and justice are the natural desires of the 
human mind ; and progress toward their attainment is 
the tendency of all mankind. The golden rule expresses 
the right in individual conduct ; obedience to the law 
expresses right in the sense of legal justice ; the doing 
of that which violates no moral obligation forms the 
conception of the moral law ; and self-interest is the 
prompting incentive in every instance. The govern- 
ment in which is imbedded the picture of every inter- 
est, representing the humble and the great, in colors 
exhibiting their real proportions, is the very embodi- 
ment of justice. 

Reason constantly searches for truth, and in every 
unbiased mind, it stands enthroned. No man, how- 
ever brutal, when two courses are open to him, prom- 
ising equal rewards, will fail to follow that which 



72 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

promises the least injury or the most good to hii. 
neighbor; and this disinterested situation expresses 
the relation which every citizen engaged in the 
ordinary pursuits of commerce sustains to his govern- 
ment. Unbiased, and unable to trace his own appar- 
ent interests in the intricate pathways which obscure 
them in their relations to millions, his only aim can 
be to discover right principles, whose widespread 
effects, may be beneficial to himself in common with 
his neighbor. 

There can be but one appeal to this vast disinter- 
ested class, outnumbering a thousand to one the 
agents who are direct beneficiaries of the govern- 
ment ; and that appeal must be the presentation of 
the principles of truth to influence the reason of the 
people. The man who will stop to consider an argu- 
ment addressed to prejudice is unworthy the name 
of an American citizen, for he endangers his own 
capacity to discover truth, and does himself the injury 
which he inflicts upon others. The man who would 
lead him astray by appealing to passion is a dema- 
gogue, and wide as the world is the rule that the 
man who employs dishonest arts to wield opinion is 
unworthy of the slightest trust. 

Unfortunately, no human system will permit the 
masses to assume the direct management of govern- 
ment. Representation is the only recourse which 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 73 

permits of Republican government within extended 
territories. If representation were perfect, and the 
desires of disinterested citizens were transmitted as 
the controlling agencies to the minds of their dele- 
gates, the Republic would present the perfection of 
human government. The right and truth sought by 
the people would be the goal of those, who, reflecting 
every just impulse of the human mind, are possessed 
of the highest intelligence required for investigation, 
and are free from the influence of ignorance and 
passion. 

Experience has shown no such happy picture. 
The responsibility of agents to the people in the con- 
duct of national affairs, so far as the implanting of 
principles in the working of the national government 
is concerned, is complete ; it is almost utterly lacking 
in everything else. The identity even of those prin- 
ciples is destroyed, and men of Conservative profes- 
sions are found battling for Radical policies, and the 
ordinary citizen is befogged in his efforts to distin- 
guish the political character of parties. 

The road to victory is no longer by an appeal to 
public reason. Before that bar, every dishonest in- 
fluence would fail. In the erection of machinery 
already invested with the authority of government, 
the few great interests fail not to discover that bribery 
and prejudice, one controlling the few and the other 



74 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

undermining the real principles of the many, are ef- 
ficient instrumentalities in overthrowing reason, and 
distorting the will of the nation. The few interests, 
capable of combination, and feeling the pressure of 
public expense, find in small conventions the ready- 
means of replenishing their treasuries from the public 
purse, and attaining an undue preponderance, if not 
an absolute control, of all the functions of govern- 
ment, to the utter destruction, not only of the polit- 
ical integrity of individuals, but also the fidelity of 
parties. 

This powerful machinery intervening between the 
people and the government, assumes the nomination 
of all officials connected with national affairs, and 
their election whenever the nomination is an equiva- 
lent. In its secret chambers, charged with more 
authority than the combined masses of people pos- 
sess, the delegate loses his character as a repre- 
sentative, and cutting off all responsibility, assumes 
the garb of an individual. In the presence of every 
temptation which can be centralized by the enormous 
special interests affected by its action, the few men 
in the political convention, fall a ready prey to their 
influence. The dishonest demagogue is thrust for- 
ward, and the tool of his superiors in the convention, 
becomes the reckless deceiver of the people. The 
issues he presents, appeal not to reason, but to preju- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 75 

dice. Catering to passions, varied in every locality, 
he reaches the goal of ambition, by promises without 
consistency, and professions which belie his whole 
character. Need we wonder that the confidence of 
the people in public rulers, in whose selection they 
feel they have borne an important part, is impaired ; 
and that political parties fail to represent, with abso- 
lute fidelity, the pure principles which establish their 
identity, and accord with the opposite tendencies of 
the human mind. 

The despot, invested with the authority of the law, 
decapitating the heads of his submissive subjects, 
presents no more appalling a picture than that ex- 
hibited by centralized special interests, controlling the 
small political conventions, by appealing to the un- 
worthy desires of their members by acts of bribery 
and the force of power, and wringing from them the 
right to assume the functions of government. Clothed 
with the authority of the government, the distribution 
of its resources only remains. Placing the bribe of 
special interest before every citizen ; undermining the 
grand principle which prompts the desire for the com- 
mon interest or the public good ; appealing to sectional 
prejudices destructive of a common nationality, the 
contest between forces, whose natural tendency is to 
discover and apply just principles, is transformed into 
a battle between elements, springing from the same 



7*> THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

machinery, whose only purpose is the distribution of 
the spoils of the government. 

In such a contest political principles are nothing, 
the welfare of the citizen is nothing, the fidelity and 
integrity of parties are nothing. Relieved of respon- 
sibility, dependent not upon the public will, but the 
will of special interests whose power alone can crush 
him, the agent, however honest, finds himself in the 
presence of influences which he cannot control, and 
the citizen feels that he is a freeman only in name. 

The intimate relation sustained by demagogism and 
patronage was exhibited in the contest in 1876 between 
the hard money and inflation wings of the Demo- 
cratic party. Hopeful of carrying Ohio and Indiana 
upon the issue which presented the prospect of an 
abundance of paper money as a balm for hard times, 
the Democrats in those States planted their standard 
firmly on that platform and seemed to speak the senti- 
ments of the West Both of these States were evenly 
balanced ; the legislature in one of them contained a 
majority of Democrats ; the local offices were half- 
filled with officials appointed as members of that party ; 
and these elements were ready to forget principle upon 
slight provocation. Other States in the West, like 
Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska and Illinois, the masses 
of the party long unused to the taste of political power, 
remembered only their long-professed principles ; and 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 77 

their representation in the national convention, almost 
with unanimous voice, united with the East in the 
demand that the party should not prove recreant to a 
policy which had always been identified with its name. 
It was their voice which controlled in procuring the 
nomination of. Tilden. 

CIVIL SERVICE REFORM. 

The existence of congressional caucuses investing 
their participants with the power of limiting the choice 
of the people in the election of President to one of 
only two persons — a power far exceeding any which 
they were chosen to exercise under the Constitution, 
is a striking illustration of the incomplete character 
of our national system. Alone it nullified every pro- 
vision established by the founders of the government 
to secure the independence of the executive from 
legislative authority. By dividing itself by party lines 
into two caucuses, Congress assumed the privilege of 
naming the persons for the highest station in the Re- 
public, and the subsequent election by the people di- 
vested of every characteristic which distinguished it 
as a free expression of the public will, became the 
emptiest of farces. The electoral college, established 
to avoid such a contingency, had early proven a failure ; 
and the absence of other machinery for securing the 
expression of the popular voice, rendered necessary 



78 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

the assumption of the power of selection by some ac- 
tive agency. An inbred prejudice, attributing to Jackson 
a remark first uttered by Marcy, that " to the victors 
belonged the spoils of victory," has led to the univer- 
sal belief that its establishment as a principle in the 
distribution of patronage was the voluntary act of a 
single executive. On the contrary, the experience of 
the present and the history of the past combines in 
demonstrating that it was the result of an unwilling 
surrender of executive independence at the dictation 
of superior congressional power. When the road to 
influence lay not in the wisdom and excellence of 
men, but in the concentration and combination of their 
own personal influence, exerted in the manipulation of 
patronage, the thirst of members of a co-ordinate 
branch of government could not be satiated except by 
wringing from the executive the control of a part of 
his perquisites. The official patronage became less a 
reward for the fealty of the energetic citizen to the 
party colors than the perquisite of the few servants 
of government clothed with legislative authority. The 
Constitution, providing that in the event of a failure to 
elect by the electoral college, the choice should re- 
vert to the House of Representatives, presented the 
singular anomaly of Congress dictating nominations, 
to which submission by the people was the only alter- 
native avoiding the contingency that would send the 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 79 

election to the House. An attempt to present a third 
candidate, possessing strength sufficient to make a 
contest, would divide the electoral college and make 
a choice impossible. The servile acquiescence on the 
part of the people to this dictation of the caucus 
rendered possible what was mistakenly called " a choice 
by the people ; " and the public mind looking on with 
indifference during the selection of two candidates, 
for whom they were compelled to vote, burst out in 
indignant rage at the outrage threatened when the 
final choice was thrown in the House. 

The grasp upon the patronage of the executive, the 
appointing power of the government, has been retained 
until the present day, and ever has been the chief 
obstacle to reform in the civil service. The servants 
of the executive are alike the servants of the senator 
and the representative ; and so long as the policy of 
all is consistent, they can render to each master the 
same allegiance. The interest of all is the same. The 
postmaster is indebted to the representative ; the 
representative to the senator ; the senator to the exec- 
utive ; and the distance from the Post Office to the 
executive mansion is narrowed by the existence of an 
implied fidelity, ensured by the power of each superior 
over all of lesser station. 

The transfer of the nominating power from the con- 
gressional caucus to the national convention, served 



80 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

only to aggravate the evil. The congressional session 
afforded opportunity for thoughtful consideration of 
the merits of candidates ; the convention, hasty and 
informal, was unsuited to its task. No rule existed 
which excluded the congressman from its doors, and 
where modesty forbade his presence, he could be 
represented by his satellites. 

The vast special interests excluded from the con- 
gressional caucus or compelled to resort to direct 
bribery to further their ends, now found a body in 
which they could participate, without objection; and 
their influence was added to the grand political com- 
bination. A system of indirect bribery was estab- 
lished, by which value was exchanged for value ; and 
the sale of influence was divested of those characteris- 
tics which rendered it most repugnant to honor. 

In view of these facts it is evident that no system 
of competitive examination to ascertain the qualifica- 
tions of subordinate officials could be established. 
Such a method, if anything, could only mean the reten- 
tion of office during the period of competency or during 
the period of life of the official. A knowledge of Grecian 
mythology is hardly essential to the performance of the 
duties of a government clerkship, but its possession 
will prove an insurmountable obstacle to the eye of the 
politician when it is substituted in the place of his will 
as the controlling agency procuring an appointment. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 8 1 

When personal interest in the control of appoint- 
ments no longer exists and can no longer be enforced ; 
when caucuses and conventions, in which personal 
service may be effectively rendered by subordinates 
to superiors, are abolished, an extra constitutional 
board may make, without objection, the appointments 
confided by the law in the executive. Until then, the 
pleasure of those powers whose interests are affected 
by every appointment, will prevail ; and appointments 
will be the gift, not alone to political, but personal 
service. 

The recent order of the president directing his sub- 
ordinates to abstain from participating in the man- 
agement of political machinery, opens a question of 
greatest significance to the people. It indicates that 
the president rightly conceives the nature of the 
disease which has debauched the civil service, and his 
assurances, together with important circumstances 
attending his installation into the high office of ex- 
ecutive, indicate the good faith of his efforts. The 
magnitude of the undertaking and the incomplete 
sphere of his own influence, are quite sufficient 
to arouse the forebodings of every patriot. It seems 
a difficult task to impress upon the public officer 
that his elevation was not in some way a reward 
for political service ; and that his retention does 
not depend upon redoubling his energies in the same 



82 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

direction. Whatever may be the competency of 
the agents in the Custom House for the duties they 
undertake to perform, they are conscious of their 
capacity to manipulate a primary or to run a political 
convention ; and it is not unnatural that they hold to 
their hearts the consoling conviction that the merit 
most pleasing to their superior is that which tends 
most to his benefit. The honest performance of the 
duties of office are hardly consistent with the dishonest 
arts of the politician nor are the delicate trusts of a 
clerical station appropriate to the rough habits of reck- 
less and burly political workers. The years during 
which these qualities have been deemed compatible, 
may measure the depth of our political degradation, 
while they afford no pleasant commentary upon the 
magnitude of the task of reform. 

Scarcely had the order been issued before symptoms 
of the coming storm began to appear. The Southern 
policy, forced by the embittered state of the public 
mind, furnished the rallying cry of the demagogues, 
whose political existence was attacked in every quarter. 
A policy, whose condemnation gave a falsehood to 
their every utterance could not be carried into effect 
without destroying their consistency ; and the patron- 
age upon which depended their personal influence, 
was stricken from their hands by the order which 
rendered it valueless. The contest between the presi- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 83 

dent representing the honest instincts of the people, 
and the demagogues representing their own per- 
sonal interests, involving the question whether offi- 
cials shall perform public or a private duty, was one 
well calculated to array upon opposite sides the ele- 
ments of honesty and its foes ; while the circum- 
stances are such as to permit by each the use of ap- 
propriate weapons. The denunciation of the Southern 
policy appealing to the prejudices of the people is 
employed to preserve personal power, and to continue 
in existence the bane of the public service ; while the 
common sense and candor of the masses will be the 
support of the executive, in his efforts to smother 
color and sectional antagonisms beneath issues in- 
volving the purity of the civil service. 

The order, if carried into full execution, can only 
affect executive appointees. It will not touch the 
appointees of States, nor the monopolied interests now 
invested with political authority. Divesting himself 
by the nature of the order of all support from those 
dependent upon his favor, the president has engaged 
in a contest with all the personal elements in his 
party ; and within the party the battle must be fought. 
The people can render no assistance, for no means are 
afforded for the expression of their will, in a contest 
between antagonistic factions of the same party ; and 
the advantage of power to his opponents is coupled 



84 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

with that of position. The battle ground is of their 
own choosing and the contest must be fought in the 
political conventions. The-union of the political rob- 
bers of the South and the demagogues of the North 
will not fail to identify the character of the struggle, 
and the qualities of its participants. The Iowa Con- 
vention has spoken, Maine will follow, and the natural 
expectation would be that in those States where the 
Republicans have a majority, and possess the control 
of local patronage, conventions will speak in vigorous 
denunciation of the policy, while in the few intelligent 
commonwealths where the reins of power are in other 
hands, the real voice of the rank and file of the organ- 
ization will be heard with equal clearness. 

The powers behind the throne in Pennsylvania and 
other Republican States are not to be measured by 
the extent of the office-holding element alone, though 
most of that class are under obligation for their ap- 
pointments to the senator. Doubtless, in a majority 
of instances, they will array their fortunes with his. 
The capitalists also have interests and stake, and will 
render service to their natural protectors. The local 
and State patronage, connected intimately with the 
powers which have controlled that of the nation, will 
also be arrayed against the policy of the President. 

Fairly presented to the people there could be no 
doubt as to the result of the contest. Fought out in 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 85 

political conventions or in the legislative bodies the 
influence of the president will gain no easy victory 
over the combined powers which he cannot touch, and 
which will solidly be arrayed against him. The South- 
ern policy will be the handle of the politicians, and 
upon that they will boldly express themselves, and 
the policy which seeks the purification of the civil 
service will represent their secret, yet real grievance, 
for its enforcement means the destruction of their 
power. 

Civil service reform has been and will be a failure 
so long as our present election, system exists, be- 
cause in whatever guise it appears, IT PROPOSES TO 
SUBSTITUTE SOMETHING IN THE PLACE OF THE 
WILL OF THE LEGISLATOR AS THE CHIEF INSTRU- 
MENTALITY PROCURING APPOINTMENTS UNDER THE 
GOVERNMENT. By virtue of favors granted by 
members of the legislative bodies of the nation to 
active political agencies, through political influence 
and special legislation, their power over political 
conventions is more potent than the power of the 
executive. He must surrender his prerogatives, or 
forfeit his ambition. He can enforce no policy for 
the purification of the public service which involves 
a sacrifice of their perquisites. 

The direction towards administrative reform lies 
in divesting patronage of its influence by making 



86 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

nominations dependent upon the will of all rather 
than upon the personal exertions of a small num- 
ber; in permitting policies to be discussed and de- 
cided by the masses of parties within their own or- 
ganization, and not by the selfish agencies now 
controlling political conventions; and in the de- 
struction of that party machinery through which 
righteous policies of administration are successfully 
resisted. 

The existence of the caucus system offers an in- 
ducement to legislators for the suspension or repeal 
of rules for the government of the civil service ; and 
vests them with power to accomplish that result at 
any time. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 87 



CHAPTER IV. 

THIRD PARTIES, AND THEIR FUNCTIONS. 

The downfall of a political organization is usu- 
ally preceded by various premonitory symptoms. 
The moment decisive victory perches upon the 
banners of an organization, divided counsels begin 
to prevail within the defeated party. When the 
hope of victory no longer prompts the exercise of 
united strength, its adherents will become regardless 
of party attachments. When success cannot be 
achieved by unity, the link of principle which binds 
all to a common purpose will not avail, and por- 
tions of its adherents will gradually attach them- 
selves to new organizations, holding to principles 
more nearly representing their interests. A leading 
political organization, once decisively defeated, and 
having no hope of future triumph, has no stronger 
claims to the attachment of its supporters than a 
third party, even weaker in numbers. Neither 
hopes for immediate success, but the fate of one 
has been decided, while that of the other is yet to 
be determined. 

As an illustration of this view, the progress of the 



88 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

Republican party may be presented. In 1840 it 
mustered but 10,000 supporters. In 1844 it rallied 
to its standard 62,000; in 1848, by the nomination 
of Van Buren, it polled 291,000 votes, and in 1852 
Hale received 156,000. Its supporters in 1852 were 
of a far different class from those who adhered to it 
in 1848. It was the natural successor of the Whig 
party, and to establish its claim to authority, that 
organization, and not the Democratic, must be 
weakened. With Van Buren, a Democrat, as its 
candidate, its power was inefficient ; with Hale, it 
drew its nutriment from the organization of which 
it was the natural descendant. By its intervention, 
New York, which had given a Whig plurality of 
98,000, was transferred to the Democratic column. 
In Pennsylvania, Connecticut, New Hampshire, and 
Rhode Island, the relative positions of parties were 
changed in the same manner. The Southern States 
abandoned the Whig cause almost in a body ; for 
the agitation of abolitionism in one section aroused 
the same discussion in the other. The rise of the 
new party was witnessed with sufficient alarm in the 
South to cause a reaction in that section in favor of 
the Democratic party. The popular vote of the 
Whig party was reduced from 47 per cent, to 44, 
while its electoral vote of 56 per cent, for Taylor 
was cut down to less than 1 5 per cent, for Scott. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 89 

This overwhelming defeat at once gave the masses 
of the Whig party a free choice between the failing 
old organization and the rising new one. At the 
election of 1856, the new party cast 38 per cent, of 
the popular vote as against only 5 per cent, four 
years prior, while the party embodying Whig ideas 
was reduced from 44 per cent, to only 22. 

The correctness of the view that new organiza- 
tions thrive upon soil where leading parties are 
unevenly balanced is shown by the experience of 
the now growing National party. In each State its 
recruits are mostly gathered from the weaker of the 
two great parties. In the evenly matched States of 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, and Ohio 
it has comparatively few adherents. At the most 
recent election in Connecticut, the National vote 
was 7.95 per cent. ; in Indiana, 9.50 ; in New Hamp- 
shire, 8.58 ; in New Jersey, 2.67, and in New York, 
9.06 — in no case reaching 10 per cent. In States 
where parties are less evenly matched a different 
state of affairs exists. In Delaware, the National 
vote reached 21 percent. ; in Illinois, 15 ; in Kansas, 
19.57; in Missouri, 17.82, and in Tennessee, 10.37. 
In the Southern States, where the Republican party 
has virtually disbanded, the Nationals bid fair to be 
the future organization to give battle to the Democ- 
racy. 



90 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

An examination of the elements composing the 
new organization will disclose that it is a result of 
the merging of the discontented elements of the 
old parties. Like all parties organized since the 
war, it recognizes that no new issues can Occupy the 
public mind until sectional issues are finally and 
completely excluded from national politics. The 
Liberal party originated this doctrine. The adoption 
of Greeley as the candidate of the Democracy gave 
it a temporary approval on behalf of that party; 
but the southern element, injected into Congress, 
keeps alive the old issues by demanding the enact- 
ment of repealing legislation, whose effect would be 
to restore the country to a normal condition. The 
Grangers, in some of the States, arose to power 
upon local issues; the workingmen of California 
seek the correction of local ills, and the National 
organization in every State embodies those in its 
ranks, who, tired of the old questions of political 
policy, have burst asunder the chains of the parties 
which represented such issues. Wide as may be 
the differences upon financial theories of the new 
party, its adherents agree in restricting monopoly 
power, and are ready to give their efforts to the 
establishment of any party identified with that end. 

The most interesting aspect in which a third 
party presents itself is in its relation to the majority 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 91 

principle. During the growth of such a party the 
majority rule seldom prevails, but the government 
is frequently exercised by a minority party. This 
relation, therefore, is one of grave consequence to 
the people. 

The demand that requires the concurrence of the 
will of a majority to elect cannot be disregarded 
with safety in any republican or popular govern- 
ment. The majority represents alike the physical 
force and intellectual capacity requisite to insure 
popular respect, and to give vigor and health to 
public administration. It personifies the power 
ample to sustain those vested with the performance 
of the functions of government. In every organ- 
ization the voice of the majority is expressive of 
the will of the whole ; and the consent of no society 
can be inferred from the judgment or action of a less 
number. Our own history has afforded repeated 
examples of the disastrous consequences resulting 
from the election of a chief magistrate, chosen by 
the concurrent voice of less than a majority of his 
fellow-citizens. In 1824 and 1876 revolution was 
threatened, while in i860 the choice of the presi- 
dent by less than one-half of the people afforded 
alike a pretext for rebellion, and the indulgence of 
the hope that those whose votes were expressive of 
a majority of sentiment would exhibit their fidelity 



IM 



92 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

when the contest was transferred to the field of 
arms. 

To insure the triumph of a majority at the ballot- 
box, by some means the contest must be limited to 
two candidates. The introduction of a third candi- 
date is nearly certain to result in the choice of a 
plurality — an objection which would apply to the 
system of the late Senator Morton, to that of Sen- 
ator Buckalew, and the one suggested by the com- 
mittee of the House of Representatives, with quite 
as much force as to the present electoral system. 
To realize the necessity of this rule, the popular 
vote for president since 1824 may be examined with 
profit. Fourteen presidential elections have been 
held, in which the masses of the people have parti- 
cipated indirectly in the choice of president, by the 
election of the members of the Electoral College. 
In five instances, less than a majority of the people 
have concurred in the choice of the person declared 
elected. In i$2&, Adams received 32.18 per cent, 
of the popular vote; in 1844, Polk received 49.55 
per cent. ; in 1848, Taylor received 47.36 per cent. ; 
in 1856, Buchanan received 45.34 per cent. ; and in 
i860, Lincoln received 39.91 per cent. 

In four of the five instances, it may be safely 
affirmed that had the field been limited to two can- 
didates, each representing one of the leading politi- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 93 

cal organizations, the elected candidate would have 
received less than a majority of votes. The votes 
for Jackson and Crawford united were more than 
the combined vote for Adams and Clay ; and either 
of the first named, if the choice had been left to the 
people, would doubtless have been chosen over 
either representative of the opposing political force. 
In 1844, when Clay received 48.14 per cent, of the 
popular vote, the 2.31 per cent, cast for Birney rep- 
resented a number which would have preferred 
Clay to Polk, and would have given the former 
more than the 1.86 per cent, required to place him in 
the majority. In 1848 the 120,000 Democrats, who 
voted for Van Buren in New York alone, would 
have been nearly sufficient to transfer the majority 
of the popular vote from Taylor to Cass. A com- 
parison of the returns of the election of 1848 with 
those of 1844 will demonstrate that of the 300,000 
votes cast for Van Buren, at least 200,000 were given 
by those whose natural affiliations were with the 
Democratic party ; and this strength, not diverted 
from its proper channel, would have given Cass a 
majority of the popular vote. 

It is needless to reason that in i860 Lincoln could 
possibly have received a majority of the popular 
vote had the contest been between him and a single 
Democratic opponent. 



94 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

These facts exhibit how the voice of a real ma- 
jority has been frustrated in popular elections by the 
introduction of a third or dummy candidate, who 
himself received but two or three per cent, of the 
popular vote. In 1828 a vote of 5.98 per cent., 
diverted in the same manner, would have defeated 
the popular will, or the voice of the majority. In 
1832, 4.96 per cent, would have sufficed ; in 1836, 
0.83 per cent. ; in 1840, 2.89 per cent. ; in 1852, 0.93 
per cent. ; in 1864, 5.06 per cent.; in 1872, 5.63 per 
cent. ; and in 1876, 0.94 per cent. 

In view of these facts the most sober reflection 
may be invited upon the functions which third 
parties now perform in a single election for chief 
magistrate by means of the ballot ; and we may ask 
whether the five per cent., enrolled under their ban- 
ners, do not possess all the power exercised by the 
masses of the people, who are limited to a choice 
between two candidates presented by machinery 
foreign to the laws of the government. The five 
per cent, are not sufficient to elect their own nom- 
inee ; but they can decide the election between 
the two leading candidates, and this is all that the 
majority of the people can do at the election. 

We are justified, then, in saying that any system 
of elections which permits a plurality as distin- 
guished from a majority to elect, and fixes the de- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 95 

cision at a single election, is open to the grave 
objection that all the power, which ought to be 
exercised by a majority, is transferred to and 
usurped by from ninety three-hundredths of one per 
cent, to less than six per cent, of the whole people. 
It will be seen from the results of the elections 
to which we have alluded, that a citizen who allies 
his fortunes to a third party contributes by that 
act to the defeat of the principles held by the lead- 
ing party with which he is most in sympathy. He 
withdraws one vote from the organization with 
which he has hitherto acted, of which its leading 
opponent receives the benefit, in order to add to 
the strength of a new party, without immediate 
hopes of success. The fact that large interests and 
important principles represented by the leading 
parties are at stake, and are involved in the choice 
between the two parties, one of which will be in- 
vested with the control of the government, is the 
main obstacle to the formation and perpetuity of 
third parties. These interests and principles must 
be sacrificed in forming an alliance with a new organ- 
ization. The voter would shrink from giving assist- 
ance to his political enemy, but yet at one election 
the chief effect of his vote is to strengthen his 
opponents. The constantly changing issues, arous- 
ing new sentiments in the public mind, give no 



g6 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

assurance that parties will represent the same views 
from year to year, and every alteration in the ap- 
pearance of the political horizon threatens the exist- 
ance of a third party. The views which a citizen 
desires to advance in one year, through the medium 
of a new political agency, may be overshadowed by 
the issues of the next, and those issues are involved 
in the success of one or the other of the leading 
parties. The adherents of third parties are there- 
fore constantly changing, and its numbers are as 
likely to diminish as to increase. It has no assur- 
ance of permanence, and will move quickly to the 
front or speedily disappear. 

Yet, under the present system of elections, the 
citizen is confronted with but one other alternative. 
He may be the servile follower of his party. He 
may obey with constancy the mandates of its con- 
ventions. This course, or that of open rebellion, 
either by direct alliance with its open enemies or 
a union with a new party, is all that is left to him. 
His servility may be rewarded with partisan vic- 
tory ; his independence will be punished by defeat. 

Perhaps he may examine with profit the assump- 
tion that a convention may actually and correctly 
represent the will of the masses composing a party. 
If truly representative, it would incorporate the 
views of its adherents, and leave no excuse for with- 
drawals from its ranks. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 97 

Whatever views may be presented by a third party, 
they are upon one or the other side of a given line 
of party distinction. In their tendencies or demands 
they are identified with one party or the other. It 
is impossible that a third party should embody in 
its ranks adherents whose respective views have no 
link of identity ; and it is equally impossible that 
the views professed by and common to a class of 
advocates should not bear a more intimate relation 
to those professed by one of the leading parties 
than to those put forth by the other. An alliance 
with the most congenial party would seem to be 
prompted by the dictates of common prudence. 
Its adherents would be most open to conviction. 
A choice would be presented between an open 
battle, calculated to alienate that organization whose 
adherents it is sought to proselyte, and an appeal 
within the party to those whose views are distin- 
guished only by a shade of difference from those 
urged upon their attention. With eight millions of 
voters, divided into two parties of four millions each, 
two millions are all that is necessary to control the 
action of either party. Divided into three contest- 
ing organizations, over two millions six hundred thou- 
sand are necessary to insure success. If the con- 
ventions were really representative of the party 
voice, the road to success for a new political force, 
7 



98 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

acting within an established party, would be less 
difficult than if it acted outside. The advocates of 
the new ideas would employ their reasonings upon 
congenial elements, and the number necessary to 
convince within the organization would be smaller 
than that required to insure victory to a new or 
third party. None of the adverse circumstances 
now surrounding attempts of separate party action 
would appear. Such a separation is an acceptance 
of political exile for a series of years, the breaking 
of an alliance with political friends, an exposure to 
constant temptations, and a connection with a force 
liable at any time to be betrayed into the hands of 
enemies. The associations of a new party are often 
disreputable, and its integrity is open to constant 
reproach. Its power, when justly exercised, is feeble, 
and when improperly employed is dangerous. . In a 
word, it is a party organized against the forces of 
nature, and its existence can only be accounted for 
by the failure of the machinery of leading parties to 
represent the popular will of their adherents. 

Yet, with all their disadvantages, third parties are 
looked upon as reforming agencies. As between a 
choice of reform within a party, involving a contest 
with the elements which control its management, 
and a battle outside, the independent citizen is not 
slow to choose. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 99 

Still, must we not ask with surprise what method 
of election is this which compels a choice between 
such alternatives as those as the only means of re- 
form? 

Third parties, therefore, necessarily spring up be- 
cause the machinery of the leading political parties 
is not representative. If their adherents possessed 
an opportunity for the proper assertion of their will 
through that machinery, there would be no occasion 
for its attempted assertion outside. Fairly defeated 
within the organization, they could have no claim 
for appearance as a separate force. 

As the people are looked upon as the fountain of 
reform, their control of one-half of the election 
should be as complete as that of the other. 

This demand would seem to be the first and 
highest duty, not only of every third party, which 
exists because of party machinery, but also of every 
independent citizen, who feels free to act, regardless 
of party obligations, because the party itself has 
failed to furnish the proper instrumentalities for his 
representation within its ranks. As long as they 
are denied a legitimate influence within one of the 
controlling organizations, they are justified in any 
independence they may manifest. 

These facts, which are verified by the observation 
of every person, would seem to point to some method 



IOO THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

of insuring a fair expression of the voice of citizens 
within the party as the most convenient. They would 
seem to indicate that the present system is almost 
certain to produce a chaotic condition. The issues 
submitted are mixed, the voice of the majority is 
not represented, that of each party is stifled, and the 
ultimate control is vested in a very small minority 
of the people. 

No party can rightfully demand the allegiance of 
citizens and deny them a voice in its councils. No 
citizen should be compelled to vote for a candidate 
in whose selection he has had no part. And the 
machinery of the government should never be under 
the control of a minority. Submission to the con- 
trol of a minority wipes away the rule which pre- 
scribes the limitation: as to the number who should 
be clothed with power. 

Let us suppose that the law should now say that 
the people must vote for one of the two candidates 
nominated by the two leading parties. Then, would 
not they demand a voice in the selection of those 
candidates ? Would they be satisfied with the pres- 
ent method ? Yet such a law would only describe 
the actual situation at the present time. The choice 
is limited to two candidates. The force of circum- 
stances, which compels a choice between such can- 
didates, has the force of law in its operation upon 



IN THE UNITED STATES. IOI 

the public mind. The barren privilege of voting 
for a third candidate, without a prospect of his suc- 
cess, does not alter the condition. Such a vote is 
only withdrawn from one party and withheld from 
the other. Why, then, should not the demand be 
as positive and as firm when the conditions are pre- 
cisely the same, and lack only a formal enactment 
into the body of the law ? 



102 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

CHAPTER V. 

GOVERNMENT BY THE PEOPLE. 

The capacity of the people for self-government 
has been shown by the experience of the Republic. If 
any believe that the experiment has proven a failure, 
improvement of present methods would be a better 
corrective than a change in the form of government. 
With the suffrage in the hands of all male citizens, 
it cannot be taken away. A brief inquiry into the 
manner of its exercise, and as to how far it has re- 
alized or disappointed the expectations of the found- 
ers of the government, affords the only profitable 
task for the student. 

In the Federal Convention, much distrust of the 
people was expressed. There were no lack of com- 
pliments to public virtue, but misgivings had their 
foundation in the supposed influence of demagogues. 
Madison, who perhaps better than any other, em- 
bodied in his opinions the principles of the Constitu- 
tion as it was finally established, Mr. Wilson, of 
Pennsylvania, afterwards associate judge of the Su- 
preme Court, and Governor Morris, of New Jersey, 
all strongly urged the advisability of a direct election 
by the people. For one Mr. Madison expressed him- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. I03 

self willing to make the sacrifice of the interests of 
the South to secure this end, believing that the bene- 
fits to the whole people would amply compensate for 
the loss in influence by that section whose population 
was largely composed of persons not invested with 
citizenship. Some thought that orders of citizens be- 
cause of their strength would control the election, 
especially where a plurality only was required to elect ; 
and in illustrating that point, the Cincinnati, the order 
of revolutionary soldiers, was specially mentioned. 

Throughout the records of the convention are 
spread the thoughts of philosophers and statesmen. 
In a knowledge of constitutional and political princi- 
ples whose accuracy had been demonstrated in the 
experience of nations, its members excelled, perhaps, 
any other body whose deliberations have marked a 
historical epoch. The common law of England, de- 
scribing with precision the limits of private liberty, 
and the constitutional law of that nation picturing the 
sphere of public authority, were imbedded in the new- 
formed Constitution. The checks upon revolutions, 
and the principles of civil and political liberty alike 
received due attention. All that experience had 
disclosed was fully weighed, and the exact limitations 
of power, the exact balance of authority, and the in- 
dependence of each branch, were ensured to the 
agencies invested with the reins of government. 



104 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

No chief magistrate acting by popular consent 
had ever existed before. Experience was there- 
fore silent ; and the members of the convention, in 
their caution, feared to invest the people with any 
authority beyond the selection of their legislative 
servants. The student of the present day, with the 
history of the Republic before him, possesses the 
means of judgment which were not accessible to its 
founders ; and his investigations will not fail to re- 
veal the errors, with reference to the portions of the 
structure of government which could not be based 
upon past experience. The utterances in the discus- 
sion upon the methods of electing president, disclose 
several erroneous impressions which prevailed in the 
Conventions, to which experience has since given a 
most satisfactory answer. 

i. The fear that a single order of citizens would 
control the election of president by enlisting a plu- 
rality of voters in behalf of its interests, has proven 
groundless. In every locality where a plurality only 
is required to elect, the votes of citizens are divided 
substantially, as in those communities where a major- 
ity is essential, between two parties ; in accordance 
with that tendency in the public mind to compromise 
their differences in order to render success more cer- 
tain. Outside of the two leading parties, minorities 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 105 

are always feeble, and most frequently so insignificant 
as not to hold a balance of power. 

2. The fear that large States would control the 
smaller ones has been discovered to be equally ground- 
less. The operation of the government and the ef- 
fects of popular suffrage has at no time exhibited an in- 
clination on the part of large States to gain an advan- 
tage over their weaker neighbors. Aside from the 
single instance of a sectional party, the people within 
each of the States have found common interests felt 
by every citizen in the Union upon which to unite. 
Strange, too, with the instances of party combinations, 
frequently referred to during its deliberations, in all 
the States in the Union, dividing nearly equally their 
citizenship, its members failed to discern that the 
formation of the Union would transfer the field of 
action to the nation ; and that the same array of equal 
forces would battle for the possession of the authority 
of the central government. 

3. The gravest error of all, was that which erected 
a system of popular elections by which representation 
was secured, without responsibility. No aim was 
more persistently sought than that of securing the 
responsibility of legislature to the people. By elect- 
ing the lower house frequently, and by limiting the 
term of the executive to four years, it was thought the 
responsibility of both branches was secured. The ex- 



106 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

pectation of popular divisions into small factions, and 
the belief that States would insist upon the represen- 
tation, each of its own peculiar and separate interests, 
alike contributed to the impression that citizens would 
vote directly for their individual preference, uncon- 
trolled by any intermediate body. The experience of 
the past has demonstrated, most unmistakably, that 
to secure the representation of their party feelings, 
they will sacrifice their opinions as to the individual 
honesty and the individual capacity of their candi- 
dates ; and consent to sustain the persons presented 
by any agency which usurps the name and pretends 
to represent their party. Only by so doing can they 
give effect to their ballots. The responsibility which 
the founders of the government sought to ensure to 
the people, was thus transferred to bodies which 
usurped the authority of making the selection of every 
official, and those bodies, unlawful in themselves by 
rules of action established by their own members, 
have divested themselves of the slightest responsibil- 
ity to the classes they claim to represent. 

Underlying all of these erroneous impressions is a 
doubt of the competency of the people to make proper 
selections for the high offices of the Republic, and the 
college of electors, chosen by the Legislatures of each 
State, was intended to establish a body of men of high 
ability to whom the selection of chief magistrate was 



IN THE UNITED STATES. I07 

to be confided. A consideration of the phenomena of 
nature and the action of human beings will disclose 
how mistaken is this distrust. The Creative Being 
who has invested man with intellectual capacity, has 
clothed intelligence with dominion over the mind 
and passion of- ignorance. The Unseen Intelligence, 
whose handiwork is exhibited in all the beauties of 
nature, receives the homage of every intellectual 
being. The priest, not more from his authority than 
the respect of his less favored congregation, receives 
the homage of the adherents of his church. The 
statesman receives the applause of a large constitu- 
ency, whose capacity, though not sufficient to compre- 
hend the intricate details of his policies, is yet ample 
to admire his wisdom and discernment. The humble 
artisan submits willingly to the benign control of a 
government whose workings he may not understand, 
but whose movements he well knows are controlled 
by an intelligence greater than his own. It is this 
rule, wide as the breadth of nature, which com- 
pels the homage of physical power in the presence 
of intellectual superiority, and which renders endur- 
able the dominion of kings, surrounded by capable 
courtiers. 

The growth of intelligence is almost in the precise 
ratio of the advance of intellectual supremacy over 
physical power, and the advantages of universal edu* 



108 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

cation in every country, are appreciated by all. Yet, 
the power of virtue, integrity and capacity, are not 
alone upheld by men vested with high intellectual 
qualities, but they ensure as well the protection of 
ignorance from injustice, and earn its constant venera- 
tion. The beneficial influence of that citizen, with in- 
telligence only sufficient to appreciate his apparent 
interests, by the action of his independent judgment, 
can hardly be as great as that of his humble neighbor, 
who, feeling his own ignorance, is led to substitute the 
will of some superior, in whose ability and integrity 
he possesses full confidence, in the place of his own. 
Virtue, charity, honor are not alone the concomitants 
of intelligence, but their home is found as well in the 
hearts of the humblest of the people, and their pres- 
ence in the minds of the poor is just as available when 
they lead that class to trust the integrity and virtue of 
competent superiors. Education leads to abetter ap- 
preciation of the path of duty, and extends the grasp 
of conscience, only when separated from the power of 
selfishness. 

The diversity of employment, the spread of intel- 
gence by means of a thousand presses, the intimate 
and neighborly relations called into being by the vast 
network of railroad communication, the immense ex- 
tension of trade, all contribute to establish upon firm 
foundations the civilization of our people, and furnish 



IN THE UNITED STATES. IO9 

the strongest chords of mutual interest. The citizen 
of New York participates in the profits of the pro- 
ducer of the West and the South ; and the intricate 
problems of commercial economy train his mind in 
every art of investigation. 

The universality of the rule by which the inferior 
places his power at the disposal of a superior in whom 
he has learned to put his trust, in itself, explains the 
concentration of public opinion in that direction which 
gives it effective expression ; and this method by 
which the masses avail themselves of the competency 
of their leaders in judging of and promulgating polit- 
ical principles, would be quite as efficient in judging 
of the individual candidates presented for their ap- 
proval. The circumstances, which have been de- 
scribed, that compel the establishment of bodies pos- 
sessing the functions of selecting the officials of the 
government, limit the expression of the public will to 
such agents as possess the qualities of mind and en- 
ergy needed to secure an admission within them, and 
the expression is not that of the whole body politic, 
but of a simulated voice, sounded by selfish influences 
attracted to the meetings. With the masses of peo- 
ple refusing to attend primaries, with interested in- 
fluences controlling them, with small conventions 
open to every artifice of bribery, it cannot be said 
that the people are represented. The management 



HO THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

of this machinery demands peculiar qualities, at war 
with those which characterize the honest and com- 
petent official. It moves so far in opposition to the 
actual interests of the public as it may with safety. 
The moral sentiment of the people alone repels it, and 
the effective expression becomes weaker as the in- 
crease of population enlarges the number of interests, 
to be compromised in order to ensure an effective op- 
position. The Sumners, the Wells, the O' Conors, 
the Evarts, the Adams control public sentiment 
and the perceptions of conscience which they exhibit, 
find an echo in the public mind. They fill no offices ; 
the machinery of party never seeks them except when 
impending defeat compels its abandonment by influ- 
ences more selfish ; yet in retirement, by the moral 
sentiment of which they are types, the machinery of 
parties is held in check. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. Ill 



CHAPTER VI. 

PROPOSED CHANGES IN ELECTION MACHINERY. 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION. 

" The mode of appointment of the chief magistrate 
of the United States," says the Federalist, " is almost 
the only part of the system, of any consequence, 
which has escaped without censure or which has re- 
ceived the slightest mark of approbation from its oppo- 
nents. The most plausible of these, who has ap- 
peared in print, has even deigned to admit that the 
election of president is pretty well guarded. Ex- 
perience has sadly demonstrated how mistaken was 
the view of the provisions relating to this subject. In 
the election of third president, the will of the people 
was almost frustrated by the arts of political intrigue. 
The patriotism of Hamilton, rising above the partisan- 
ship of his own political associates, saved the country 
from the presidency of Burr. In 1824, a minority can- 
didate was installed in the station of chief executive 
through its instrumentality ; and in 1876 the strongest 
appeal to the conservative instincts of the people suf- 
ficed to save it from the terrors of intestine revolu- 



112 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

tion. How must these incidents recall the sentiments 
of Benton, given as a last warning to posterity ! 

" I have seen," said the Missouri statesman, " the 
capacity of the people tried at many points, and always 
found equal to the demands of the occasion. Two 
other trials, now going on, remain to be decided to 
settle the question of that capacity. I. The election 
of president ! and whether that election is to be gov- 
erned by the virtue and intelligence of the people, or 
to become the spoil of intrigue or corruption. 2. The 
sentiment of political nationality ! and whether it is 
to remain co-extensive with the Union, leading to har- 
mony and fraternity ; or divide into sectionalism, end- 
ing in hate, alienation, separation and civil war. 
An irresponsible body (chiefly self-constituted and 
mainly dominated by professional office-seekers and 
office-holders) have usurped the election of president 
(for the nomination is the election so far as the party 
is concerned), and always making it with a view to 
their own profit in the monopoly of office and plunder. 
******** Confederate Republics are short- 
lived — the shortest in the whole family of govern- 
ments. Two diseases beset them — the corrupt elec- 
tion of chief magistrate when elective ; sectional con- 
tention when interest or ambition are at issue. Our 
confederacy is now laboring under both diseases ; and 
the body of the people, now as always honest and 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 113 

patriotic in design, remain unconscious of the danger, 
and even become instruments in the hands of their 
destroyers." * 

A glance at the debates of the conventions which 
adopted the Constitution, will disclose the fact that 
the chief inducement leading to the establishment of 
the electoral system was that it gave the South the 
proportional representation permitted in the House 
of Representatives. The leading objection to a pop- 
ular plan arose from the view that negroes would be 
unrepresented, and the States of the South would 
have their influence reduced in proportion. Though 
seldom referred to in the convention, the institution 
of slavery seems to have been the inspiration of this 
portion of the system. The rights of the States, as 
opposed to the view of a common nationality, were 
chiefly urged in their relation to this interest of human 
property. Strange, it is, that the very system estab- 
lished to secure the united expression of the voice of 
the States rendered possible the success of a party, 
whose presence proved the destruction of the evil. 
The concentration of the united voice of the North 
alone sufficed to secure the election of Lincoln by 
a vote of 180 out of 303 in the Electoral College; 
while the popular vote was nearly a million against 
him. The House of Representatives, representing 
* Benton's Thirty Years' View, vol. ii. p. jZj. 



114 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

more closely the choice of the people, would have 
been opposed to the administration, if any effort 
had been made to interfere with slavery ; and this 
fact more than any other contributes to exhibit the 
causelessness of the rebellion. The withdrawal of 
Southern representatives alone gave the Republicans 
a majority in either branch of Congress. 

On several occasions the proposition to amend the 
Constitution in such a manner as to secure to the peo- 
ple the nomination as well as the election of candi- 
dates for president has been before Congress. In 1 824 
four candidates were presented to the people. Adams, 
Jackson, Clay and Crawford, the two last named being 
nominated by a congressional caucus which submitted 
its differences to be decided by the people. At the 
election which followed the popular vote cast for Jack- 
son was 155,872; for Adams, 105,321 ; for Clay, 46,587; 
for Crawford, 44,282. The electoral vote for Jackson 
was 99, Adams 84, Crawford 41, Clay 37, Mr. Adams, 
though not receiving even a plurality of the popular 
or electoral vote, was chosen president by the House 
of Representatives. 

The event created much excitement throughout the 
country. In Congress an amendment to the Constitu- 
tion was introduced by a committee consisting of Mr. 
Benton, Mr. Mason, Mr. Van Buren, Mr. Hugh L. 
White, Mr. Findlay, Mr. Dickenson, Mr. Holmes, Mr. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 115 

Hayne and Mr. Richard M. Johnson. Without quoting 
the provisions of the amendment, we will give Mr. Ben- 
ton's statement of them. " The detail of the plan is to 
divide the States into districts ; the people to vote 
direct in each district for the candidate they prefer ; 
the candidate having the highest vote for president to 
receive the vote of the district for such office and to 
count one. If any candidate receives a majority of 
the whole number of districts, such person to be elect- 
ed ; if no one receives such majority, the election to 
be held over again between the two highest." The 
remainder of its provisions relate to possible, though 
extremely remote contingencies, and to the canvassing 
of the votes and the declaration of the result. In 
January, 1835, a committee of the House of Repre- 
sentatives was appointed to consider the subject, and 
Mr. Gilmer, a member of the committee, reported an 
amendment substantially like that of Mr. Benton. 
The chief difference was that the results were to be 
canvassed by States instead of districts, and the can- 
didate receiving the largest number of votes in a 
State was to be entitled to its electoral vote. 

We quote from the debates of Congress to ascertain 
the purpose of these amendments. " Mr. Benton," it 
is stated, " proceeded to state the object and principle 
of his amendment, which was to dispense with all in- 
termediate bodies in the election of president and vice 

9 



Il6 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

president and to keep the election wholly in the hands 
of the people ; and to do this by giving them a direct 
vote for the man of the choice, and holding a second 
election between the two highest in the event of a 
failure in the first election to give a majority to any 
one. This was to do away with the machinery of all 
intermediate bodies to guide, control or defeat the 
popular choice ; whether a Congress caucus or a 
national convention, to dictate the selection of candi- 
dates, or a body of electors to receive and deliver their 
votes ; or a House of Representatives to sanction or 
frustrate their choice. 

Mr. Benton spoke warmly and decidedly in favor of 
the principle of his proposition, assuming it as a funda- 
mental truth to which there was no exception, that 
liberty would be ruined by providing any kind of sub- 
stitute for popular election ; asserting that all elections 
would degenerate into fraud and violence, if any inter- 
mediate body was established between the voters and 
the objects of their choice and placed in a condition to 
be able to control, betray or defeat that choice. The 
fundamental truth he supported upon arguments, drawn 
from the philosophy of government and the nature of 
man, and illustrated by examples taken from the history 
of all elective governments which had ever existed. He 
showed it was the law of the few to disregard the will 
of the many when they got power into their hands, 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 17 

and that liberty had been destroyed wherever inter- 
mediate bodies obtained the direction of the popular 
will." 

" At present he said that the will of the people was 
liable to be frustrated in the election of their chief 
officers (and that at no less than three stages of the 
canvass) by the intervention of small bodies of men 
between themselves and the object of their choice 
First, at the beginning of the process, in the nomina- 
tion or selection of candidates. A Congress caucus 
formerly and a national convention now, govern and 
control that nomination ; and never fail when they 
choose, to find pretexts for substituting their own will 
for that of the people. Then a body of electors to 
receive and hold the electoral votes, and who, it can- 
not be doubted, will soon be expert enough to find 
reasons for a similar substitution. Then the House 
of Representatives may come in at the conclusion and 
do as they have done heretofore and set the will of 
the people at absolute defiance." 

The main provisions of the plan of Mr. Morton, 

which was introduced in the Senate in May, 1874, are 

as follows : — 

I. The president and vice-president shall be elected 
by the direct vote of the people in the manner follow- 
ing : Each State shall be divided into districts, equal 
in number to the number of representatives to which 
the State may be entitled in the Congress, to be com- 



Il8 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

posed of contiguous territory, and to be as nearly 
equal in population as may be ; and the person having 
the highest number of votes in each district for presi- 
dent shall receive the vote of that district which shall 
count one presidential vote. 

II. The person having the highest number of votes 
for president in a State shall receive two presidential 
votes from the State at large. 

III. The person having the highest number of 
presidential votes in the United States shall be presi- 
dent. 

Another plan has received some attention and is 
worthy of full consideration. It is known as the 
" Buckalew plan," and aims to secure minority repre- 
sentation in the election of president. This plan was 
introduced in the House of Representatives by Mr. 
Maish, of Pennsylvania, on February 7th, 1877. The 
amendment provides for a direct vote by the people 
for president and vice president ; it retains electoral 
votes as at present, while dispensing with electors 
and electoral colleges, and it assigns to candidates 
electoral votes from each State in proportion to popu- 
lar votes received by them therein. Its advantages 
are very ably set forth by Mr. Buckalew in the January 
1877 Noi'th American Review. He claims that it 
would almost extinguish the chances of a disputed 
election by causing the electoral vote to be very nearly 
a reflex of the popular vote, by confining the effect 
of fraud and other sinister influences within narrow 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 119 

limits, and by withdrawing the compact, undivided 
power of any one State from the contest ; that it would 
render almost impossible the election of a minority 
candidate, and in many cases, would prevent a plurality 
candidate from receiving an unjust electoral vote ; and 
that it would greatly discourage and prevent unfair- 
ness and fraud in elections, by excluding the motives 
which produce them. Assuming a ratio of thirty 
thousand for an electoral vote, a fraudulent vote of ten 
thousand would mean one-third of one electoral vote. 
The plans proposed by Mr. Benton and Mr. Gilmer 
were discussed in Congress from 1824 until 1835, but 
no decision was reached. The recent presidential con- 
test has aroused new interest in the matter, and Mr. 
Morton and Mr. Buckalew's systems will doubtless re- 
ceive due consideration in Congress. 

THE PLANS CONSIDERED. 

The aim both of the plan of Mr. Morton and that 
of Mr. Buckalewisto correctly photograph the strength 
of each political party in every locality throughout the 
country. No material difference would appear in the 
results of elections if the plan of either were applied. 
Mr. Buckalew's amendment would serve to show the 
inequalities of party strength within the respective 
States in exact proportions, while that of Mr. Morton 
would exhibit them in a form less definite. The sys- 



120 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

tern proposed by Mr. Benton has a deeper aim, divulged 
by its construction and the arguments used by its in- 
ventor. He sought to avoid the necessity of the in- 
tervention of any intermediate bodies in the election 
of president. That end, we fear, would not be attain- 
ed by the adoption of his system. 

Each tends to avoid complications which, from time 
to time, have threatened the safety of the union ; but 
none strike at the vital questions presented in these 
pages. The issues which our present system of elec- 
tions prevents the people from deciding, are still in the 
background. With reference to Mr. Buckalew's plan, it 
may be remarked that so long as a majority of one is 
as useful and as powerful in every elective body, as 
a majority of a million, it matters little how large the 
representation of the minority may be ; and the intro- 
duction of a system, revolutionizing our present 
methods can hardly present advantages counterbal- 
ancing its tendency to intensify partisan feeling already 
too deep for the nation's good. 

If what has been written is not sufficient to convince 
that the plan of Mr. Benton will not secure the aim it 
seeks, examples taken from the experience of the na- 
tion are at hand. Under it, the possibility exists of 
the selection of two candidates of the same political 
views at the first election ; and such a condition would 
work the virtual disfranchisement of the opposite 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 121 

party at the second election. With Blaine, Conkling, 
Morton and Bristow to divide the strength of Republi- 
cans, and only Tilden and Hendricks to divide the 
votes of Democrats, the probability would be that the 
second election would be held to decide between the 
two last named. If efforts were made to combine by 
one side, that course would be followed by the other ; 
and hence the final decision would be had at the first 
election, and concentration would be ensured by the 
methods and agencies now in vogue, whose existence 
Mr. Benton deplores. 

The partisan sense will find an expression unless it 
can be eliminated from controversy by the establish- 
ment of a system which permits of the subordination 
of partisan feeling, without endangering the final suc- 
cess of the party. That feeling is inbred in the habits 
and prejudices of the people ; and its existence is the 
only explanation of the power of political conventions — 
a power ever increasing with the numbers it assumes 
to represent. By the few voters in a small district, 
Seelye could be elected to Congress ; but for president 
O'Conor, representing the faith of the Democracy, 
opposed to its life-long opponent, Mr. Greeley, could 
rally to his standard only a corporal's guard of popular 
support. In the year the system of Mr. Benton was 
proposed an election was held which illustrated the 
force of our views. Mr. Adams was a candidate rep- 



122 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

resenting the wing of the Federal party fast sinking 
from the field of politics. Mr. Clay represented the 
views of its natural successor, the growing organization 
of the Whigs. Both represented the same Radical 
shade of opinion. Though party lines were never so illy 
defined, and the people were experiencing the pleasure 
of the first exercise of the franchise in the election of 
president, yet Mr. Adams received no votes of conse- 
quence inStates where Clay was predominant ; nor did 
the latter receive any considerable number in States 
in which Mr. Adams was one of the leading candidates. 
In Alabama, Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachu- 
setts, Mississippi, New Hampshire, New Jersey and 
Rhode Island, Clay received only 1 1 78 votes to nearly 
100,000 cast for Adams. In Indiana and Illinois 
alone was a division in the party permitted where it 
endangered the success of their common cause. 

The same characteristic is illustrated in the votes 
for Jackson and Crawford. Where Jackson ran with 
the hope of success, those who personally preferred 
Crawford sacrificed their opinions of the individual 
and sustained the party standard. The election of 
i860 exhibited the same features. In the great States 
of Ohio and Illinois, Breckenridge received a vote 
reaching scarcely one-twentieth of that cast for Doug- 
las. In New York a fusion ticket was run ; while in 
Pennsylvania, where the supporters of Douglas far 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 23 

outnumbered those of his Democratic competitor, the 
fear of partisan defeat constrained his supporters to 
swell the vote of a fusion ticket to 178,000, while their 
own favorite received but 16,000. In the South, where 
the fear of Republican success did not exist, the vote 
for Douglas was about one-third of that for Brecken- 
ridge, especially in those States where the combined 
strength of Douglas and Bell was not needed to defeat 
the Kentucky candidate. 

In the election of 1824, the historian of New York 
informs us that in the Legislature, after a compromise 
between the supporters of Adams and Clay, "the 
ticket thus formed was nominated by the assembly, 
but upon joint ballot of the two Houses, in consequence 
of three blank votes, so nearly were the parties divided, 
only thirty-two of the thirty-six electors were declared 
duly chosen. Upon a second ballot four of the Craw- 
ford men were elected. If Crawford had carried New 
York instead of Adams, the electoral vote would have 
been Jackson 99, Crawford 67, Adams 58, and Clay 37. 
The second election under Benton's or Gilmer's system 
would have been held between the two candidates rep- 
resenting the same administrative policy, while those of 
more divergent views would have found little in the 
policy of either to lead them to participate. If the 
vote of Pennsylvania had been cast for Clay instead 
of Jackson, the second contest would have been 



124 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

between Adams and Clay, together representing 150,- 
000 of the popalar vote, while their opponents had 
received over 200,000 votes." * 

Only in the State of North Carolina was the contest 
limited to two candidates of Democratic antecedents ; 
and the explanation is found in the figures of the 
election of 1832, where the supporters of Crawford 
and Jackson cast 24,862 votes to only 4563 for the Whig 
candidate. It may not be unworthy of remark that 
the four Crawford electors, chosen by the support of 
Adams' friends in New York, made the former, instead 
of Clay, one of the three candidates presented to the 
House of Representatives, and thereby permitted the 
concentration of the vote of Whig representatives 
upon Adams, who was elected. If Clay had received 
them, it is very probable that he would have been 
chosen president. In view of the fact that his party 
predilections and sentiments dictated the support of 
Mr. Adams by Mr. Clay, we are at a loss to explain the 
utterance of senator Morton, who puts in parenthesis 
that he believes Mr. Clay to have been a pure man 
" nevertheless." " The election was thrown in the 
House," says Mr. Morton, in one of his recent articles, 
" and there Mr. Clay voted for Mr. Adams, used his in- 
fluence for him, and afterwards became his secretary of 
State. This created an impression from which Mr. 
* Political History of New York. Vol. II. page 177. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 25 

Clay never recovered. I have never believed there 
was a bargain in the case, but it presented a strong 
temptation and the opportunity." 

It is provided in the plan of Mr. Morton that the 
person having the highest number of presidential 
votes shall be president. The fact that this provision 
violates the rule which requires the concurrent voice 
of a majority, as distinguished from a plurality, to 
elect, is less an objection to the theory of the system 
than one of a practical character. The theory of 
Republics is that each shall submit his own will to 
that of the majority. It has been well denominated 
the vital principle of Republics. A majority of 
citizens, equal in political privileges, is equivalent to 
the power of dictation possessed by the larger of two 
forces, comprising men of equal physical capacity, 
upon the battle-field. It is the peaceful arbiter of 
all questions which otherwise m:ght be submitted to 
the chances of war. 

The senator is unquestionably correct in declaring 
that, "Experience has shown us that there is more 
safety in a large electoral body than in a small one ; " 
but if the purpose was as he declared, " to brush away 
rubbish " and " bring the election of president to the 
people and let every man vote for the candidate of his 
choice," its efficacy may be safely challenged. The 
only possible effect of his system will be to transfer 



126 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

the popular vote now cast for electors in each district 
to the candidate for president, for whom they are 
chosen to vote, and Conventions would be necessary to 
select the candidate for the people as they now are to 
dictate to the electoral college. These agencies are 
the " rubbish " which it is evidently intended to 
"brush away" by letting " every man vote for the 
candidate of his choice." In 1872 the unquestioned 
preference of the mass of the Democrats was Mr. 
O Conor, and not Mr. Greeley ; but under our system 
a vote for that gentleman was practically a vote for 
the candidate of the opposing party. Up to this 
time, the votes of the people have not been misrepre- 
sented by the electoral college, and when a citizen 
chooses to nullify the effect of his ballot by voting for 
" the candidate of his choice," no one will deny his 
right of doing so. The difficulty is that our present 
system so surrounds him with circumstances which 
he cannot control, that he is compelled to follow the 
dictation of leaders in order to give the slightest effect 
to his ballot. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 27 



CHAPTER VII. 

THE DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM. 

A SYSTEM of presidential elections, consistent 
with the views advanced in these pages, may be 
imbodied in the following language : 

I. One person may be nominated for President 
by resolution of any State Legislature. Such res- 
olution shall state that the person named therein 
is nominated for the " First Presidential Canvass " 
or the " Second Presidential Canvass," as the case may 
be, and shall be transmitted to the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, and be by him published. 
A person nominated for both canvasses shall elect 
in which canvass his vote shall be counted. 

II. The President shall be elected by direct vote 
of the people. The person having the highest num- 
ber of votes for President, shall be President, if such 
number be a majority. If no person have such ma- 
jority, then a second election shall be held between 
the person nominated for the " First Canvass " and 
the person nominated for the " Second Canvass " 
having the highest number of votes ; and the person 
then having the highest number of votes for Presi- 
dent, shall be President. 

This method may not be perfect. Bodies here 
intervene to guide the sentiment of the people. 
The number of persons acting in the choice, how- 
ever, is very large. It is equal to the sum total of 



128 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

all the members of the legislative bodies in the 
country ; and no class of citizens can by any pos- 
sibility be left unrepresented. It affords the means 
of centralizing, in a natural manner, the public 
voice upon a few candidates. The indorsement of 
several legislatures may be given to the same candi- 
date, and public feeling will be most likely to ap- 
prove the persons having the largest number of 
honestly given indorsements. By an invariable rule 
the public voice is centralized upon three candi- 
dates, or a less number, however many there may 
be in the field. The masses of the people will pos- 
sess an almost unlimited power over the selection of 
candidates. 

Another method could be devised which would 
leave the power of selection in the unrestricted 
hands of the people. The ballots of Democrats 
could be identified by words printed thereon. The 
words " first canvass " would be sufficient as an in- 
dorsement. The ballots of the opposite party would 
then be identified by the words " second canvass " 
printed upon them. So identified, the votes cast by 
each party could be separated by the canvassing 
boards, and the sense of each organization accu- 
rately ascertained. This plan would possess many 
advantages. With the indorsement hidden, the 
secrecy of the ballot would be maintained. Al- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 29 

though somewhat complex, this method would af- 
ford a perfect representation of the popular will. 

Under the plan first presented, the President is 
nominated by the State legislatures, which nomina- 
tion is made by resolution, stating either that the 
person named therein is nominated for the " first 
Presidential canvass," or the " second Presidential 
canvass." The votes for persons nominated for one 
canvass are to be counted or canvassed separately 
from those nominated for the other, and the results 
of each canvass are to be declared accordingly. 
The sense of each political party is thus ascertained 
the same as if each had voted at a separate election 
or caucus. 

The plan will be readily understood by suppos- 
ing that Tilden had been nominated by the legisla- 
tures of New York, New Jersey, Georgia, and other 
States; Hendricks by those of Indiana, Kentucky, 
and several others. On the opposite side, Blaine is 
presented by the legislators of Maine, Butler by 
those of California, Conkling by those of New York. 
Other States then ratify these nominations. The 
Democratic candidates are nominated for the " first 
canvass" and the Republicans for the " second can- 
vass." An election then is held, with the following 
result : 

First canvass — Tilden, 2,320,000; Hendricks, 



130 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

2,045,000. Second canvass — Conkling, 1,560,000; 
Blaine, 1,620,000 ; Butler (representing the Nation- 
als), 1,450,000. 

As no person receives a majority, the person 
nominated for the first canvass, and the person 
nominated for the second canvass, having the high- 
est number of votes, will contest the second elec- 
tion. The Democratic or first canvass candidate, 
having the most votes, is Tilden. The Republican 
candidate is Blaine. Under the plan of Mr. Benton, 
which has been discussed, Tilden and Hendricks 
would have been the candidates at the second elec- 
tion, those gentlemen having the highest number of 
votes without regard to canvass or party. 

The effect of the application of either system 
would be substantially the same. Both embody the 
fundamental ideas of the reform proposed, viz., first, 
the choice of officials by the voice of a majority, 
arising from the limitation of the contest to two 
persons at the second election, each the representa- 
tive of one of the .natural antagonistic elements of 
the country ; and, second, freedom of choice in the 
nomination of candidates. Under either, no class 
of men cculd claim support for a nominee on the 
ground that he was the representative of a united 
party until that party had fairly expressed its voice ; 
no faction could cajole with promises or threaten 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 131 

with political ostracism those who disregarded its 
demands ; but each citizen, bound by no obligation 
to support any one in the nomination of candidates, 
without fear that his action would endanger his 
party's success, and without disobeying the prompt- 
ings of party fidelity, could make a conscientious 
selection wholly with reference to the considerations 
which should govern his choice. Need we say that 
the vast majority, acting in substantial accord with 
their respective parties, would consider honesty and 
capacity the first qualifications demanding the ap- 
proval of their suffrages. 

Examining the proposed system in its relation to 
the political machinery it supplants, the caucuses 
and conventions of political parties, it will be found 
to work a change in four particulars : 

I. It substitutes direct nominations of candidates 
by the members of the respective political parties in 
place of nominations by delegates to conventions. 

II. It applies the election laws to primary elec- 
tions. 

III. It provides that both political parties shall 
participate in the same primary election, instead of 
having a different caucus for each party. 

IV. It provides for a final election to be held be- 
tween two candidates, each the representative of a 
party. 



132 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

These are the fundamental propositions of the 
system. Thoughtful men will bestow their atten- 
tion upon these, leaving matters of detail to be cor- 
rected by experience. 

I. Direct nominations is the method now in suc- 
cessful operation in the city of Philadelphia, in most 
of the counties of Pennsylvania, and in some other 
sections of the Union. It has become the practice 
in many of the counties in New York, and the ten- 
dency is toward its universal adoption. No in- 
stance is known where the method, once applied, 
has been abandoned. The system has stood the 
test of experience, and has met the approval of the 
people. Under it, in most cases, the candidate, who 
receives the nomination receives it as the gift of a 
majority of his party. Most frequently two, and 
sometimes three candidates, divide the votes of the 
caucuses. The people centralize their votes upon 
few candidates with the same ease as at general 
elections. 

The convention system is at variance with the 
fundamental principles of the government. 

The leading principle which it violates, as we 
have explained, is one lying at the vitals of the 
government — the principle of responsibility. Per- 
sons in official station should be as close to the peo- 
ple as possible. Our government is representative. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 133 

The idea of representation suggests and embodies 
a picture of the popular will. The more perfect the 
responsibility the more perfect becomes the repre- 
sentation. Direct nominations by the people would 
insure direct responsibility. Under the present sys- 
tem the responsibility, which should be left to the 
people, is shifted to the agencies controlling the con- 
vention which makes the nomination. The power 
exercised by such agencies becomes absolute when 
the nomination amounts to an election. 

The interposition of a delegate diverts attention 
from the real issues naturally involved in the con- 
test ; those having reference to the honesty and 
capacity of the candidates. The election of dele- 
gates by a small number of persons introduces the 
element of their personality in the contest. The 
candidate is forgotten. Personal appeal of the dele- 
gate seeking election to the convention is most 
potent. The distant candidate is unthought of. If 
the vote was to be given direct, the public character 
of the candidate would control the choice of the 
citizen. Personal effort and secret manipulation 
now undermine the true instincts and desires of 
the elector. 

II. The consideration already given to the prop- 
osition to apply the election laws to political pri- 
maries renders it unnecessary to recur at length to 



134 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

that subject. Under the proposed plan the primary- 
becomes an election. 

The feeble expression of the popular voice through 
delegates, and the lack of legal safeguards at the 
primaries, afford ample explanation of the absence 
of the better class of citizens from these gatherings. 
Law is instituted to repress brute force, and where 
its influence does not reach, malicious agencies may- 
exert their power unchallenged. However affec- 
tionate may be our feelings for popular institutions, 
it need not be wondered that monarchic ideas are 
taking root in the public mind ; for, as in the days 
of the Roman Republic, wise and moderate men, 
who, disliking strife, have abandoned these stormy 
primary assemblies, seem to feel it a small matter to 
be deprived of the franchise, whose beneficial exer- 
cise they have already renounced. 

If elections were conducted like primaries, and 
delegates were chosen with absolute power to elect 
officials, the mass of citizens would feel little inter- 
est in the election. They would abandon that place 
where they now exercise only a negative power, as 
they have abandoned the agencies where their in- 
fluence might be affirmative and efficient. 

III. The method presented contemplates the par- 
ticipation of the members of all political parties in 
the same primary as well as in the secondary elec- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 135 

tion. This method is at once suggestive of conven- 
ience. Mercenary characters, who may now attend 
and vote in the primaries of different parties, would 
be restricted to one vote. The " floating " voter, 
as distinguished from the honest independent, im- 
proves every opportunity, while the latter, intent 
upon the selection of the choice of evils, is uncer- 
tain of his political status until the nominations are 
made. Through the agency of the former, the ac- 
tual will of honorable citizens composing one party 
may be, and frequently is, overawed by the active 
hirelings of men who may be high magnates of the 
opposite political organization. 

The failure of laws for the regulation of primary 
elections is chiefly owing to the fact that political 
parties hold separate gatherings. The political char- 
acter of the voter cannot be identified by his appear- 
ance. In these times of political changes, honorable 
men are often at a loss to say where their political 
party allegiance belongs. The calls of a party in- 
vite all who approve its principles and all who desire 
reform. There are few persons that do not advo- 
cate some of the propositions put forth by every 
party. This fact establishes their right to be pres- 
ent at the primaries of any party ; and no court can 
say that they do not possess the right. So informal 
are the proceedings prior to and at these meetings, 



136 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

it becomes impossible to define the class of persons 
entitled to the privileges of a party. 

The law will not take cognizance of such informal 
transactions. It cannot lay down rules distinguish- 
ing a Republican from a Democrat or a Nationalist. 
Experience and common-sense have proven the im- 
potency of the courts to enfroce penalties where the 
rights of persons depend upon such uncertain con- 
siderations. Only by bringing citizens at one pri- 
mary is the law enabled to protect the rights of all. 

Under the plan proposed, formality takes the 
place of informality. The citizen is fully protected ; 
each voter possesses an equal privilege. He may 
cast one vote and no more, and to his own con- 
science is left his party predilections. The result is 
ascertained by the canvassing boards as easily and 
as certainly as if each party had held a different 
caucus. 

The court, to enforce penalties, needs only to in- 
quire whether the person voting, or offering to vote, 
is a legal voter. 

The beneficial effects to flow from the free inter- 
mingling of voters, intent upon the selection of 
proper candidates, may be safely left to the imagina- 
tion of the reader. 

The practical politician may see in this scheme a 
means by which the weaker party may become the 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 137 

prey of the stronger. The latter may so distribute 
its strength as to secure the larger vote for two 
nominees of its own, between whom the second 
election would be contested. If the power of com- 
bination induces that fear, it will prove groundless, 
yet a condition akin to this will result from natural 
causes. A party too weak to make a nomination, 
under the advantages which the system affords 
could present no claims which would entitle it to 
contest the second election, where it would be cer- 
tain to meet with an overwhelming defeat. Under 
it no parties but those having the hope of victory 
would exist. That branch of our review will be 
reached when we consider the relations of the sys- 
tem to local elections. When each party hopes for 
ultimate success at the final election, it will not frit- 
ter its strength in striving to control the nomination 
of a political adversary, when that success depends 
largely upon the number of its adherents as shown 
in the canvass at the first election. To those who 
share such fears may be commended the considera- 
tion of the opportunities afforded by the present 
system for stifling the will of the weak ; for under 
that system the members of the most powerful 
party are restrained only by their moral sense from 
the primaries of weaker organizations. 

IV. The limitation to a choice between only two 



I38 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

candidates presents a branch of inquiry that has 
been fully treated in describing the functions of 
third parties. It will suffice in this place to repeat 
what has already been stated, and to outline the 
views upon which this limitation is based. A major- 
ity will, with certainty, result only when the choice 
is limited to a selection between two candidates. 
Every issue presents but two sides. Every decision 
upon any public question, presented to the legisla- 
ture of the State or nation, depends upon the num- 
ber arrayed either for or against it. It is affirmative 
or negative. Advocates and opponents make the 
contending forces. 

The people have divided into tv/o vast political 
parties. By this means alone is obtained a satisfac- 
tory decision upon questions presented to the peo- 
ple. Two great parties arise as the necessary con- 
sequence of an attempt on the part of the masses to 
perform the functions allotted to them in the gov- 
ernment. The political habits or prejudices of the 
people preserve these organizations intact. The 
issues made appeal to the widest constituencies. 
They affect the broadest and largest interests. The 
questions attain the dignity of issues only when 
they enlist the support or challenge the opposition 
of masses of voters sufficient in number to cherish 
the hope of victory. The highest point of combina- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. I39 

tion, for the purpose of measuring strength, is at- 
tained when the masses are divided into only two 
opposing parties. Organizations and issues arise 
and fall amid the chaotic surroundings which attend 
overwhelming victories or defeats. New issues can 
alone restore the failing fortunes of a beaten ad- 
versary. Upon its hope of future victory depends 
the fidelity and number of its adherents. Failing to 
present new issues, its place is taken by a new or- 
ganization which scatters the old to the winds. 

When two forces are evenly matched, third par- 
ties have few adherents. The issue must be vast, 
indeed, and its relation to the welfare of immense 
bodies of citizens most intimate, to entice from or- 
ganizations, already possessing the strength and op- 
portunity to dispose of existing questions, a number 
sufficient to give a plurality of votes to a third party 
whose only function is to present a new one. Such 
a party cannot aspire to be more than a balance of 
power until the critical period arrives when the 
giants engage in the battle of life or death. 

Under the proposed system those who now com- 
pose a third party could battle on equal terms with 
all adversaries at the first election, undismayed by 
the discouraging surroundings that now impede its 
progress and undermine its strength. If it possesses 
force sufficient to nominate a candidate under either 



140 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

canvass, he may be voted for at the final election. 
Its principles are thereby immediately brought to 
the front. Afforded an equal opportunity at the 
first election, the limitation of a voter's choice to 
two candidates at a subsequent election could work 
no injustice ; for those who failed to secure approval, 
when two persons are to be selected, could have no 
hope of success as against candidates, who had al- 
ready demonstrated their prowess, when the choice 
to be made is that of a single person. 

At the first election the issues would be clearly 
made up, and in their submission at the second, no 
voter could be misled as to their import. There 
would be but two sides, one of which must be ac- 
cepted by the voter. If a limitation to two candi- 
dates is essential to insure a choice by a majority, 
it would be absurd to deny the masses the right to 
select them. The fact that freedom of choice is 
now permitted at the election affords the only ex- 
cuse for a denial of his rights in the nomination. 
When that freedom is taken away by the limitation 
to two candidates, its exercise must necessarily be 
allowed at the preliminary election wherein those 
candidates are to be chosen. In selecting the can- 
didates at the primary election, the issues would be 
determined by a larger number than is now required 
to control the election itself, through the interven- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 141 

tion of third parties. This has been discovered in 
our examination of the third parties. At present a 
citizen occupying one position has a greater power 
than he can exert in another. The effect of the 
new system would be to invest each citizen with 
equal power in the management of the government. 
A method could be devised which would permit 
both of a selection and final choice of candidates at 
one election. It would, however, be complex and 
unsatisfactory. An amendment prescribing that 
candidates could be nominated for a first or second 
canvass ; and that the person having the highest 
number of votes in the canvass in which the highest 
aggregate number of votes has been cast, should be 
declared elected, would accomplish this end. It 
could also be insured by permitting each voter to 
cast a ballot containing the names of, say, five per- 
sons for any office, one of whom would be desig- 
nated as " first choice," the two persons having the 
highest number of " first choice " ballots being cred- 
ited as against each other with all the votes they 
received otherwise than as " first choice." The 
one then having the most votes could be declared 
elected. If the party character of the ballots was 
distinguished, the one class from the other, by the 
words first and second canvass respectively, and the 
votes of each class were canvassed separately, the 



142 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

two candidates would be of opposite parties. This, 
however, would not insure a choice by a majority, 
and would be open to some of the objections of the 
present system. 

The first step toward the attainment of this re- 
form in Presidential elections will come from Con- 
gress or the State legislatures. The writer sug- 
gested to some of the members of the former body 
the propriety of permitting a designation of a can- 
didate for President and Vice-President by the peo- 
ple upon their ballots at Presidential elections. This 
proposition was embodied in the report of one of 
the committees, proposing a rider to the Appropria- 
tion Bill in 1879. It was finally stricken out, with 
other matter not pertinent to the subject under 
consideration. 

Its adoption would have taken the power of selec- 
tion from political conventions, and vested it in the 
Electoral College, guided by an exact expression of 
the popular will. In most instances the electors 
would doubtless have cast their ballots for the can- 
didate of their own party having the most votes. 
This state of affairs would not. long continue. The 
people have shown their distrust of small bodies as 
the final arbiters of elections, whenever the choice 
of a President has been thrown into Congress. The 
change in the electoral system in 1825 was due to 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 143 



this distrust. But this would be the first stage of 
the process by which they would finally possess 
themselves with the complete control, not only over 
the nomination, but over the final election. 

The proposition is worthy the attention of State 
legislatures; for they only can permit the designa- 
tion of candidates for President and Vice-President 
upon the ballots containing the names of the elec- 
tors. 



144 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 



CHAPTER VIII. 

• LOCAL ISSUES. 

Our government has substantially as many parts 
as there are political divisions. It is desirable that 
the public attention in the election of officials shall be 
bestowed upon the question of fitness of candidates, 
and the matters relating to the management of the 
affairs of each division. Town offices and issues 
should be considered by corporate members of towns ; 
city matters by voters in cities ; county affairs in 
county elections, and State and national concerns in 
elections held for officials to attend to the duties of 
those functions. If these separate concerns are not 
separately considered, elections within them are ex- 
pensive farces, having no bearing upon the purposes 
for which they are held. The officials elected with 
propriety might be all appointed by the president. 
The objects of State government and the nature of 
its powers and duties differ greatly from those of the 
nation and from those of the lesser communities which 
it creates. The principles of legislation partake of the 
same nature, but assume different names. The State 
has no power to coin money, to make war or peace, 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 145 

but that principle which demands the localization of 
power into its hands requires from it further localiza- 
tion by extending the jurisdiction of cities, counties 
and towns. The Democratic principle would require 
general laws rather than special enactments; and 
though far-reaching in their effects, the party profess- 
ing the fundamental doctrine from which they spring, 
has never yet assumed their special guardianship, nor 
has it, as a party, cer.sured the widest departure from 
them by its adherents or opponents. The rule which 
requires the strict construction of laws, is seldom put 
in operation, and it is quite as apt to be applied in 
special cases by one party as the other. The spoils 
only are involved, and their capture will warrant the 
relinquishment of principle at any time. 

The ingenuity of statesmen during the past century 
has been applied to discover some means by which 
public attention could be attracted to these important 
concerns. The localization of power tends to permit 
of some combination in small localities, which, at 
times, overcomes partisanship ; but it avails little in 
communities containing more than a thousand voters. 
Elections are held in some of the States, at which, in 
theory, only State officers are elected, but, in practice, 
only national affairs are discussed. Spring elections 
are held in a portion of the States for the election of 
town officers, but the nominations are dictated by the 
two political parties. . The recent municipal commis- 



146 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

sion suggests the limitation of suffrage to tax-payers, 
but these practically possess only the qualification of 
tax-gatherers who collect their taxes from the rent- 
payers. These devices never have availed to, and 
never can, secure the aim sought. The masses of 
each party will seek to obtain a result which may be 
heralded over the country as a victory for their partisan 
views. No degree of intelligence will suffice to estrange 
the voter from giving attention to those attractive 
subjects which concern the happiness of millions, and 
relate to his own welfare as a component part of the 
world of commerce ; which involve war and peace, and, 
to a larger degree than any other, ensure the march 
of intellectual and moral progress of the people. These 
results are only to be accomplished through political 
parties, acting as national organizations ; and at no 
place where can be shown fidelity to the principles he 
assumes as his own, will the citizen fail to proclaim 
them. However distant and indefinite may be the 
bearing of his act, so long as it indirectly affects the 
supremacy of his views as a member of his party, he 
will not fail to bestow it to assist in the solution of 
the leading questions. 

It would unquestionably be an absurdity to elect 
directors of banks, officers of literary societies, officials 
of railroad corporations by the votes of their partisan 
associates ; but it is no less an absurdity to elect 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 147 

partisan mayors of cities or even governors of States, 
when the principles which distinguish their political 
character are never discussed in their relation to the 
affairs over which they rule. The explanation of the 
weakness of temperance parties is found in the fact 
that they attempt to force upon the national sentiment 
a class of legislation imposed by the law upon the 
States, whose functions are remitted to obscurity by 
the engrossing character of national concerns. The 
Grangers of the West, the strongest independent 
organization ever witnessed in the country, failed for 
the same reason. Complaining of local abuses, it could 
not establish its identity as a national organization; 
and the moment the indignation which called it into 
being had passed away, it was obscured by the en- 
veloping wings of the standard parties which represent 
the community of feeling that follows the movements 
of the national government. In these questions, not 
one, but all classes have a constant interest. A foreign 
policy threatens war; a poor currency may bring 
disaster ; a legislative enactment invades the liberty 
of opinion and involves the public safety. These are 
questions which, aroused constantly by the friction of 
government machinery, demand the attention of its 
servants to the subordination of others. 

The weakness of all third parties results from the 
fact that they present questions which are not issues, 



148 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

and the people disregard them by voting for the only 
policies which are really involved. The efforts for 
liquor prohibition, presented as an abstract principle, 
would, probably, receive the approval of a majority of 
the people of the country ; but, as such legislation 
comes only under the dominion of States, no national 
organization strong enough to enforce the demand 
can ever secure it a hearing ; and so long as State 
issues are subordinated, the advocates of prohibitory 
law will be few at every election. 

No more effective criterion of the importance of 
various forms of government to the people, can be 
given than that presented in the amount of taxes 
they absorb. Applying the rule of population as the 
measure of relative consumption, New York would 
appear to consume one-tenth of the goods taxed by 
the nation, and this consumption of one-tenth of the 
articles imported pays that proportion of the expenses 
of government. This would amount to about $40,- 
000,000 per year. The sum of State, town and county 
taxes, exclusive of school tax, amounts to $57,000,000 
per year — $15,000,000, or 26 per cent, for State pur- 
poses ; and more than three times that amount for 
county and town expenses. The amount of national 
taxes paid, including the public debt expense, is d 
trifle more than the amount of local taxation for town 
and county purposes. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 149 

What, then, are these important interests which re- 
quire this heavy drain of taxation ? Scarcely $3,000,- 
000 out of the $15,000,000 are required for general 
purposes; $5,000,000 are for the bounty debt; $i r 
000,000 for the new capitol, and the remainder for the 
schools and public expenses. Prior to 1874 nearly 
two millions of dollars were required for ordinary re^ 
pairs on the State canals. 

When we investigate the amounts of money ex- 
pended for purposes which are debateable, as com- 
pared with those which are compulsory, it is found 
that the local expenditures far exceed those of the 
national government, within the respective localities. 
Deducting the amount of payments on the national 
debt, interest and pensions, about $130,000,000 would 
remain to be paid for miscellaneous expenditures and 
the support of the army and navy. New York's pro- 
portion would be about one-eleventh or $12,000,000, 
which would be about one-fifth of the total tax paid 
by its citizens. Nor is this hardly just to the national 
government, for it is compelled to increase its force 
to -manage the expenditures applied to these extra 
purposes — the pensions, debt and interest — and the 
additional force is paid out of the fund we style mis- 
cellaneous. With the public servants necessary in 
ordinary times the expenditures would be greatly de- 
creased. Instead of being $ 1 30,000,000, in i860 they 
amounted to onlv $60,000,000. 



I50 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

Hence the people of New York, in ordinary times, 
would pay for the necessary expenses of the national 
government about $5,000,000, and for State and local 
expenses about $60,000,000 of taxes per year, only 
about $5,000,000 of which is applied to the reduction 
of the war obligations. 

It is clear, therefore, that, by reason of the neces- 
sity which forces into prominence national questions, 
the mass of people bestow their chief attention upon 
the issues involving the expenditure of one-tenth of 
the public expenses, and pass unnoticed the issues 
relating to the expenditure of the other nine-tenths. 

The power possessed by the legislative authority in 
the nation is exceeded by that of the same branch of 
government in the States. In the union, the powers 
of government are defined by a written constitution, 
and the authority, not granted expressly or by im- 
plication, is reserved to the people of the States. In 
the State Constitution, all legislative authority is 
granted which is not restricted. The legislature may 
exercise the most despotic power if no prohibition ex- 
ists to restrain it. No government, within the bor- 
ders of the State can be established without its con- 
sent. It may make and unmake cities ; it may grant 
to individuals special privileges ; to any department 
of local government particular powers ; and it may 
organize and regulate by its will, every business 01 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 151 

social corporation within the State. The extent of 
its powers is practically immeasurable. Every official 
is directly or indirectly its servant. It measures and 
defines the liberties of citizens, the authority of cities, 
and the duties of every public officer. 

All State and local issues, therefore, arise from 
legislative action. A passing notice is taken of a le- 
gislative enactment and then more important issues 
force it into obscurity. When a city receives a new 
charter, its electors look on with some interest during 
the discussion in the legislative chambers, but they 
are powerless to assist or retard the measure except 
by an inadequate expression of their moral sense. If 
authority is extended to bond a town, its inhabitants 
witness with some excitement the progress of a bill 
by which their pretended consents are to be obtained, 
not at a fair election, but by argument, artifice and 
fraud ; but when the act is done, it is forgotten. The 
only consequence they reflect upon is the amount of 
taxation proposed. 

When the machinery put in operation by the law 
is under full headway, new questions completely hide 
it from view ; and it goes on performing its righteous 
or unrighteous functions, unimpeded by a public sen- 
timent that is able to affect it. Occasionally, some 
exposure of corruption identified with a particular 
corporation, demands a reform so far as it is con- 



152 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

cerned ; but the thousand other organized forces, 
spreading their corrupt influences, are unobserved in 
any quarter. 

These issues, if not decided upon by the people at 
elections, must be remitted to the machinery of politi- 
cal parties. In so far as the voice of the masses com- 
posing such parties is ensured an expression within 
their structure, and no further, will it reach these im- 
portant issues. Where that voice fails to reach, the 
discretion of officials will control ; and the proper ex- 
ercise of that discretion will depend upon the honesty 
and capacity of the governing agents. The discretion 
of the legislature, enlarged by these means, possesses 
a signification which is seldom imagined. Not merely 
the qualities of an automaton are required, but that 
intelligence and honor which is incorruptible in the 
presence of the immense interests affected by the ac- 
tion of States, interests capable of controlling with the 
power of a despot, the government of the nation. 

Nor are the qualities, so desirable in every branch 
of government, susceptible of becoming political issues 
even in the nation. They cannot divide the senti- 
ments of the people. Their desirability is conceded 
by all, and their presence or absence appeals not to 
the belief, but the judgment of the voter. Unlike a 
principle, it affords no distinction between classes of 
belief, and nothing upon which can be predicated a 



IN THE UNITED STATES. I$3 

positive asservation. To secure an expression with 
reference to the important interests that have been 
described, interests which touch the daily life of every 
citizen, each voter under compulsion must accept the 
candidate of his party and adopt him as the medium 
of securing representation of his opinions in the 
government. 

Yet allied to these personal characteristics and de- 
pendent upon their existence or absence in officials, 
is the corruption which creeps into and contaminates 
the public service. The corrupt man is devoid of the 
qualities sought for in the machinery of selection. 
Honesty is a quality of the human mind ; it is a 
characteristic of an individual, for whose possession 
he is accountable not to man but to the Divine Agent 
in whose image he was created. The selection of the 
qualities, which distinguish individuals and not parties 
is allotted to those instrumentalities, whose prelimi- 
nary action, places the opposing principles in battle 
array. At elections, they are subjects of doubtful dis- 
putes, and the elevation of honor, if not attained by the 
citizen in his own organization, is only to be secured 
at the sacrifice of interests of greater apparent im- 
portance as to which the same uncertainty does not 
exist. 

Political parties in the nation are equally bal- 
anced. The element of uncertainty must exist in 



154 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

every national canvass, and the doubtful character of 
such campaigns is the nutriment of every local or 
State organization. Take it away and there remains 
no motive for Democrats in Vermont, or Republicans 
in Kentucky to participate in elections for State officers 
in their respective boundaries. As the votes of the 
minority party affect only national results, it is only 
natural that the chief attention is bestowed upon 
national affairs. Issues change constantly, and the 
introduction of new questions tends to restore the 
equality of strength. When the people have decisively 
approved or disapproved of the policy of a political 
organization, it is no longer an issue ; and the princi- 
ples of the defeated organization must be conformed 
to the tendencies exhibited by the election. When the 
people have decided against Radicalism, the party 
representing that view becomes less Radical ; if the 
decision is opposed to Conservatism, the force embody- 
ing that tendency becomes less extreme. Success 
is the aim of each party, and the principles of oppo- 
site organizations differ widely, or approximate, the 
one to the other, just in proportion as they appear to 
meet the approval of the people. 

The lines made by the national forces are drawn 
with geometrical precision through all the States, and 
elections, of whatever kind, array within them unequal 
forces in opposition. The political colors of separate 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 155 

communities or commonwealths, in each disproportion- 
ate, present throughout the country an equal appear- 
ance. As the fluctuations of sentiment in a State 
are slight, however great they appear in the aggregate, 
a decisive majority in its limits is not likely to be dis- 
turbed. The question of partisan prowess, in its re- 
lation to local affairs, is therefore unimportant, and 
the one of interest to citizens is as to what combina- 
tion shall control the machinery of the leading or- 
ganization. 

The effect of this state of affairs upon the action 
of the public is apparent. A large proportion of 
the people in States where parties are unequal al- 
ready recognize the fact that they are disfranchised, 
and refuse to attend elections at all. The usual 
vote in States where parties are even exceeds by 
about twenty-five per cent, that of the States in 
which a party nomination is equivalent to elec- 
tion. This would seem to indicate that in such 
States more than two millions of persons remain 
at home because their ballots cannot affect the re- 
sults. In 1870, as shown by the census and by the 
vote of that year, the percentage of voters who 
remained away from the polls in closely contested 
States amounted to from twelve to twenty-four per 
cent., while in States where one party largely ex- 
ceeded the other, the percentage was from thirty- 



156 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

three to fifty-nine. In Maine it was 33 ; Massa- 
chusetts, 51; Iowa, 40; Michigan, 32; Texas, 59; 
Kentucky, 48 ; Tennessee, 55 ; Kansas, 38, and Penn- 
sylvania, 45. In the closely contested State of New 
York only 23 per cent, were absent from the polls ; 
New Hampshire, 18; Oregon, 12; New Jersey, 17, 
and Indiana, 16. In all of the States mentioned 
the election was either for governor or congress- 
men, or both. 

Reforms in State or local management must be 
sought from persons in no way identified with those 
questions, but connected intimately with national 
parties. Agitation for their establishment may dis- 
turb the waves of a few harbors, but the great ocean 
of public sentiment moves on indifferent to every 
consideration except those which affect the pros- 
pects of the national organizations. If here and 
there a reform is accomplished, it has no assurance 
of permanence, and the result is due to willing con- 
cession of legislatures rather than to an efficient and 
powerful demand of the people at the ballot box. 
They are the playthings of demagogues, to be used 
as long as they subserve personal interests, and to 
be abandoned as soon as profit lies in the opposite 
direction. 

Note. — In two interesting articles, one written for the Galaxy 
and one for the Princeton Review, Mr. Robert P. Porter, of Chicago, 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 157 

gives some important facts in regard to local indebtedness. Accord- 
ing to official information conveyed to him, the municipal debts of 
130 cities had increased from 221 million dollars in 1866, to 644 
million dollars in 1876. The annual taxation had increased from 64 
to 112 millions, while the assessed valuation showed only an increase 
from $3,451,000,000 to $6,175,000,000. 

The local debts of eleven States had increased from 286 millions 
in 1870 to 546 million dollars in 1878. The valuations of property 
in those States increased from 7 to 9 billions in the same period. In 
1870 the total local indebtedness of the United States was 868 mill- 
ions ; in 1878 it was over $1,051,106,112. 



158 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 



CHAPTER IX. 

THE DIVORCE OF LOCAL FROM NATIONAL POLITICS. 

The subordination of local or State issues in local 
or State elections may be explained when examined 
from a single point of view. The apex of power is 
the control of national legislation and patronage. 
Its possession is the prize of one of two evenly bal- 
anced forces. Association with one or the other of 
these forces shows the political relation of every 
voter in the land. Great diversity of interests may 
exist in the different States, but the protection of 
the national government can be extended to no in- 
dustry which is peculiar to a single section. Such 
an industry is connected by no bond of association 
between general interests. It may not come within 
the constitutional power of the general government, 
or within the purview of congressional action. The 
management of the canals, State's prisons, railroads, 
and the insurance interests of the State of New 
York may be of gravest importance to its people, 
but they can awaken no interest beyond its borders, 
and cannot receive the guardianship of national 
parties. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 159 

All the influences controlling political action cen- 
tralize at one point, the final exercise of the voice 
of the whole people in the election of President and 
the choice of a congress. A contest involving the 
latter happens every two years, and the eyes of the 
people are directed to the issues involved in it. The 
settlement of national questions is the result of a 
slow process, running through a series of years, dur- 
ing which prejudices are being inculcated, habits be- 
coming stronger in their hold, and party attach- 
ments more firm. The overwhelming influence of 
national issues upon the public mind, represented 
by candidates in no way identified with local poli- 
cies or parties, forms the main obstacle to the dis- 
cussion of matters of local interest, even in a State 
or local election. The division is substantially into 
two, and only two parties, representing the yea and 
nay of national policy. 

Here, then, the party machine assumes its func- 
tions. It represents the divisions of national senti- 
ment. Its ramifications extend into every section. 
It disciplines and commands. It rewards fidelity 
and punishes rebellion. Fidelity is measured en- 
tirely by faithfulness to the national standard. 
Local interest, as an excuse for leaving the party 
banner, will not shield the citizen from the frown of 
the party leaders. Each party presents but one 



l6o THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

candidate, and the followers must sustain him or 
openly rebel. Opposing their party, citizens add 
votes to the strength of the enemy, and whatever 
considerations of local concern may have guided 
them, the successful side will claim the victory as 
an indication of the faith of the people in the na- 
tional policy it advocates. The processes by which 
public sentiment arrays itself upon two sides, each 
represented by a candidate presented by a national 
party, necessarily compel a verdict upon national 
issues. The candidate is nominated for his opinions 
upon national, and not local issues, and the atten- 
tion of the people is necessarily devoted to those 
questions. The organization of a party in a State 
or smaller section, based upon local issues, threatens 
the supremacy of the national party in that section. 
The bond which unites its followers to the national 
organization is at once broken. If defeated, it dis- 
solves at once ; if successful, it evaporates under 
the melting influence of the issues which arise at 
every congressional election. In any case its exist- 
ence is short, and the penalties of rebellion, con- 
stantly before the eyes of its adherents, must be 
suffered sooner or later. The growth of independ- 
ent parties is always slow ; and where they accom- 
plish reforms, the moment the excitement which 
produced them dies out, the old agencies reassume 



IN THE UNITED STATES. l6l 

their sway and gradually undo the work accom- 
plished. Of these truths, many independent parties 
furnish examples. When independent influences 
seek the assistance of the weaker of the opposing 
forces in a given locality, an unholy compromise in 
regard to the distribution of patronage appears to 
be the most tangible result of victory. 

The test, identifying a citizen with one or the 
other organizations, being his opinions upon subjects 
of national character, it follows that in State elec- 
tions the people are practically disfranchised. Nei- 
ther party is identified with the questions really in- 
volved in such an election, while the minority, from 
year to year, in unevenly balanced States, vote for 
candidates whose election is impossible. This duty 
is forced upon them. They must either cast a vote 
barren of power, or enroll their names with those of 
their political enemies, and contribute to the success 
of a party whose principles are repugnant to their 
views. 

One of the cardinal principles of Democracy is 
that of local self-government. In most of the States 
parties are unevenly matched. At the present time, 
in the South, but one party seems to exist. In such 
cases, the power is in the hands of one party whose 
control is undisturbed by the results of elections. 
The election is merged in the nomination. Local 
II 



162 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

self-government would therefore seem to mean gov- 
ernment by the agencies of the caucus. The larger 
responsibility insured by placing the power and pat- 
ronage nearer to the people, would be felt to those 
agencies, and not to the people at the election. In 
the evenly balanced nation, where the independence 
of a comparatively small number influences the gen- 
eral result, some responsibility at elections would be 
insured. 

The principle of local self-government is one of 
greatest value, when the conditions are suitable for 
the exercise of the public will. It remains, then, to 
consider how these conditions may be established. 
If the decision of local questions can be insured at 
local elections, and that of State issues at State 
elections, local self-government would have a true 
and high significance. The divorce of national and 
State politics would be finally and forever decreed. 
This examination presents the most important 
branch of our inquiry. 

The system proposed for Presidential elections, 
applied to States, would provide that, in the absence 
of more appropriate official agencies, each board of 
supervisors might present or nominate, either for 
the " first canvass " or the " second canvass," one 
person for each State office. Such persons would 
be voted for by the people. The "first canvass" 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 163 

candidate and the " second canvass " candidate hav- 
ing the most votes, would, if no majority resulted 
at the first election, be voted between at the second 
election. If any candidate received a majority at 
the first election, he would be elected, and the sec- 
ond election would be unnecessary. 

The plan could be applied to cities and counties, 
by permitting one-fifth, or a larger or smaller num- 
ber, of the legislative boards of such cities or coun- 
ties, to nominate a person for each elective office, 
either for first or second canvass. 

The operation of the other, and more popular plan, 
which provides for the identification of the ballots 
of the voter, would be substantially the same. 

The leading fact to be borne in mind in this dis- 
cussion is that either of the plans enables each 
party to present to its supporters more than one 
candidate. 

Permitted a choice between several candidates of 
his own political faith, the citizen is not compelled 
to throw off his party allegiance in making a selec- 
tion. If a Democrat, he remains a Democrat still. 
Party discipline has no application. No power to 
punish, and no reason for punishment, exist. In- 
fidelity cannot be charged against him. Therefore, 
if he chooses to cast his ballot with reference to 
local considerations, there are no external or party 



164 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

reasons to influence him to do otherwise. If a suf- 
ficient number act with reference to local matters, 
the nominees of both parties will represent the op- 
posite sides of local policies. 

The division into two parties will again result as 
an inherent rule. If a choice is made between sev- 
eral candidates of the same party, the two strongest, 
and representing elements most antagonistic within 
the party, will naturally draw to themselves the 
most votes in a nominating election. Elements 
composing the same organization will not antago- 
nize upon national policies, but their ballots will be 
controlled by those questions as to which they or the 
candidates are at variance. Such questions must 
have reference to the affairs over which the candi- 
dates are to be chosen to preside — to internal local 
or State management. Now, however, as before 
remarked, when only two candidates are presented, 
and these antagonize upon national questions, the 
popular verdict must necessarily have reference to 
such questions. 

One candidate, then, is chosen having certain 
views upon local affairs. He is confronted by an- 
other having different views upon the same con- 
cerns. In the natural order of things, each party 
would represent opposite sides of the most impor- 
tant local issues. As soon as the issues became dis- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 165 

tinct, and parties became fixed in each locality, it 
would be discovered that the differences between 
the candidates of the same party, upon these ques- 
tions, would be slight ; while, when the two opposing 
parties would confront each other, the differences in 
the policies represented would be very marked. 

Such parties in each State would be evenly 
matched. If North America were a republic, of 
which the United States was a component part, 
nominations being made under the present system, 
parties within the Union would be of uneven 
strength. The issues would spring from the center 
of the continent, and the people of the country 
would be compelled to divide upon the questions 
appropriate to every section of that large portion of 
the world. They would be such as would divide 
the masses of the whole continent into two forces, 
so evenly balanced as to afford the hope of victory 
to both. With the nation as the center, as at pres- 
ent, States, and the localities within them, show 
divisions into parties of uneven political strength. 
Large majorities and small minorities appear in 
every section, while in the nation, as an aggregate 
community, an even balance exists, affected only by 
the inequalities of representation in the Electoral 
College, and the occasional intervention of third 
parties. If the Electoral College were done away 



l66 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

with, and the President elected by direct popular 
vote, the issues represented by the Republican party 
would disappear. They exist because the sentiment 
sustaining them, concentrated in the North, is suf- 
ficient to afford hope of electing a majority of elect- 
ors,«while it could not expect to overturn a major- 
ity of half a million of the popular vote. A direct 
popular election would call forth new issues, adapted 
to make a more equal division of public sentiment. 
The moment new elements are introduced into a 
canvass, neither party can base its expectations upon 
losses and gains ; and the results will not be signifi- 
cant from a national standpoint. When gains and 
losses will have no significance, no reason will exist 
for the preservation of parties, in local elections, 
based upon divisions of national sentiment. 

The same rules will apply when State and local 
issues engage public attention, and divide parties 
at State and local elections. The State, or particu- 
lar locality interested, will take the place of the na- 
tion, as the center from which the main issues will 
spring. The two opposing parties will array them- 
selves upon opposite sides of those issues. Each 
party will present such issues as lead to the expec- 
tation of victory ; otherwise there would be no occa- 
sion for its existence. And in a brief period, as a 
result of testing public feeling, the issues will be- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 167 

come most perfectly adapted to divide the commu- 
nity into evenly matched forces. Each party will be 
organized for victory, and citizens will not sustain 
such as do not afford a reasonable prospect of suc- 
cess. If State and county elections are held at the 
same time, the parties will be more evenly balanced 
in the State than in the particular localities com- 
posing it ; for State issues will be a line of distinc- 
tion everywhere, while the lesser local questions will 
affect in a greater degree the particular sections 
from which they spring. As county officers are the 
creatures of the State, and the power exercised by 
the State legislature has a bearing upon every 
locality as important as that exercised by its chosen 
local agents, State issues are far more identified 
with the interests of counties and cities than those 
of a national character. The effect of separate elec- 
tions, at which different and clearly distinguished 
issues are presented, will be to compel citizens to 
exercise a discreet judgment as to the relative im- 
portance of State and local questions submitted to 
them at distinct or separate periods. Independence 
in political action would be the rule. In small local- 
ities, where citizens are brought into immediate 
contact with candidates, the choice, will necessarily 
be largely governed by considerations independent 
of party. When these organizations become fixed, 



l68 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

the issues at the first election, where the candidates 
represent the same shade of sentiment, will neces- 
sarily have reference to their honesty and capacity. 

If these views are correct, two distinct classes of 
questions, each class arraying upon opposite sides 
two evenly matched forces, will exist. One will be 
a division upon national issues, represented by par- 
ties like the Democratic and Republican ; and the 
other will be a division of forces, operating in local 
elections and representing local issues. While re- 
taining their organizations intact, the two local par- 
ties would not be influential in presidential or con- 
gressional elections ; while national parties would 
occupy the same position with reference to local 
affairs. 

These results might not be immediately obtained. 
A few years would necessarily elapse, during which 
the people would accustom themselves to the 
changed conditions, and form new habits of polit- 
ical thought and action. The old parties would 
probably attempt to keep the old issues before the 
people. Especially would the majority in any State 
seek to occupy public attention with the issues 
which had carried it to repeated victories. The in- 
terests of the minority would prompt its followers 
to obscure national issues, and to pay no regard to 
party at the nominating election. Candidates of 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 69 

the majority, planting themselves upon those ques- 
tions, would doubtless win many supporters, who, 
uniting with the elements favoring the discussion of 
local concerns, would soon force the adoption of 
those issues. If both organizations persisted in 
standing upon national questions, the minority now 
disfranchised would abandon their party, and seek 
to cast an effective vote for one of the candidates of 
the leading party. Their own candidate, if nomi- 
nated at the first, would be defeated at the second 
election ; while, making a choice among their op- 
ponents, they could vote for a candidate who could 
be elected. The smaller organization would soon 
disappear, and divisions upon local matters would 
soon result as a natural consequence. 

Thus would be realized the anticipation of the 
framers of the Constitution, that home issues would 
divide the sentiment of States. 

The engrossing attention given to local questions 
would prevent a despot of the caucus, like Tweed, 
from availing himself of the popular attention to 
party principles connected with national affairs to 
hide his corrupt designs upon the local treasury. 
The control of the primary or first election would 
be an undertaking of difficulty when the consent of 
the people, and not of the machine, was necessary. 
Its attainment, insured by all the arts of corruption, 



170 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

would still leave him unassisted by a vast party ma- 
jority, the assurance of triumph at the final election. 
He is yet confronted by an insurmountable obstacle 
presented by the equality of the local forces con- 
tending for power. These circumstances existing 
in every place, where the control of the government 
now depends upon the control of the caucus, would 
be efficient in protecting the people from corrup- 
tion, due chiefly to the absence of even balanced 
parties, representing opposite sides of issues perti- 
nent to the particular locality. 

A direct voice in the nomination of candidates 
and the limitation to a choice between two candi- 
dates at the second election, are both essential to 
the attainment of these results. The first permits 
the utmost freedom on the part of the people in the 
selection of issues. The second permits an expres- 
sion of their will free from the disturbing influence 
of third candidates or parties. The fact that party 
divisions through double nominations frequently en- 
ables a minority candidate to succeed, forms the 
main barrier to the introduction of local issues into 
a political canvass. The limitation to two candi- 
dates would effectually guard against national issues 
interfering with the decision of questions properly 
involved. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 7 1 



CHAPTER X. 

TYPICAL POLITICAL RINGS. 

Practical illustrations of the sources of public ex- 
penditure and the organization of rings to control it, 
are so frequent that material is ever-ready by which 
their methods of action can be explained. At the 
present time the State is engaged in a work of ex- 
travagant magnificence, viz., the erection of a State 
capitol. The outlay of $15,000,000, which it will cost, 
could illy be spared from the treasury of the people. 
When the "true inwardness" of the scheme is ex- 
posed, its corrupting effects will appear in their most 
glaring light. The building is the foundation of 
political power of many of the leading men of the 
State. It is the stock in trade of every political as- 
pirant for legislative honors. Every assemblyman 
who has influence in the higher circles of the leading 
political organization uses it to lure workingmen and 
mechanics into his political service at the primaries, 
by promising his efforts to afford them work upon it. 
Thousands of men have applied and await the sum- 
mons to begin work in places well filled by a few hun- 



I7 2 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

dred. It was part of a grand system inaugurated by 
Tweed to intrench himself into political power and 
enrich himself out of the funds of tax-payers. 

The building up of Tweed's influence presents a 
most striking commentary on the system of political 
machinery. There are thousands of Tweeds in the 
State, but only one whose fame extends to the boun- 
daries of the world. The system of fraud inaugurated 
by him was not of his invention. He used on a grand 
scale the means which are indispensible to political 
influence wherever the present arrangement of politi- 
cal machinery exists. He readily perceived that the 
greatest power was the greatest patronage ; and citi- 
zens now feel that patronage is the equivalent of taxa- 
tion. 

Personal power begins at the primaries. These as- 
semblies were practically deserted by fair minded and 
peaceable citizens. Mr. Tweed had been deputy street 
commissioner and chairman of the Tammany Hall 
general committee. He saw his way to political 
power by distributing patronage among the laboring 
men, who of all classes are most easily attracted to 
primaries. He began his career as president of the 
department of public works, and inaugurated vast 
schemes of public improvements. Whatever strength- 
ened his own political influence, increased the power 
of all whose assent was necessary to establish the 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 73 

system. Boulevards were laid out ; a new court house 
was begun ; the central park was beautified ; political 
offices were filled with sinecurists; the courts with 
Cardozas and Dowlings ; street widenings and im- 
provements were frequent. An army of thousands 
of laborers were put to work, and living by the bene- 
ficent power of their chieftain they swore ready alle- 
giance to him. Their influence was powerful in the 
primaries. They controlled them in his interest. 
Where no qualifications were needed to vote, and no 
restriction existed as to the frequency of its exercise at 
the same meeting, and where the means of colonization 
from district to district were conveniently at hand, it 
would be doing grave injustice to Tweed to question 
that he used every available method to extend his 
power. He was the great head centre, and as the 
powers which were his own and looked to him for 
direction, exceeded those of all other influences com- 
bined, every dishonest element readily became sub- 
missive to his will, as well as accessories to the ac- 
complishment p of his purposes, and participants in 
the fruits of his victory. Dishonesty has no resisting 
agencies in the presence of overwhelming power, and 
measures success by the amount of its profits. 

The system of political management connected 
with the machinery of caucuses in New York is ad- 
mirably suited to exclude the possibility of opposition 



174 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

to the will of the leading agent. The head of the 
party is the dispenser of patronage, and the general 
committee is the agency by which the favors of po- 
litical power are distributed. It controls the nomina- 
tion of a ticket which contains the names of at least 
fifty persons voted for throughout an assembly dis- 
trict. Though a large majority of citizens acting in- 
dependently might disapprove of most of the names, 
the opposition would be so distributed as not to af- 
fect the result. The ticket presented is always elect- 
ed- and usually without a contest. The delegates so 
chosen perform a duty which has already been fully 
laid out. The will of the central authority is su- 
preme, and rebellion against it is certain to receive a 
prompt and effective punishment. 

The Democratic majority of 50,000 in the city 
would lead Mr. Tweed to give no concern to the elec- 
tion. Established in the primaries, his power was 
fixed as firmly as a rock. 

Mr. Tweed did not stop here. With the Democratic 
organization of the city in his hands, he saw the way 
to the highest political power in the State. He was 
elected to the Senate from the wards comprising the 
slums of the city. Accompanied by twenty-one as- 
semblymen, bound to himself and elected ostensibly 
by Tammany, he was already possessed of a number 
nearly large enough to control the Democratic legis- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 175 

lati\*e caucus. The same system of extravagance was 
inaugurated here. The canal Ring, sustained by the 
influence which controlled the primaries and conven- 
tions along the Erie canal, readily acceded to a union 
which promised increased peculations in whose fruits 
it would share. New schemes for employing labor 
were inaugurated in nearly every county ; railroads 
were built from place to place, and their managers be- 
came the first politicians in their respective localities. 
Tweed, as he had been the centre of authority in the 
city, became the central orb in the State ; while 
every county had its lesser satellites. There were no 
political principles at stake, and personal power, es- 
tablished through the primaries, became the supreme 
end of political ambition. The taxpayers were bound 
hand and foot through them, and compelled to meet 
the expenses of the experiments. The thousand 
schemes springing from one centre, inaugurated by 
the legislative power, increased the debt of the city of 
New York nearly $100,000,000 ; and that of the State 
outside nearly the same amount — all in the space of 
three years. Not a dollar of the amount was expend- 
ed by consent of the people given in the only legiti- 
mate way ever before known, by an election in the 
localities immediately interested. The effect of this 
legislation was to build up the personal power of cor- 
rupt men in the respective localities, who were en- 



176 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

abled to fill their own coffers from the people's pock- 
ets, with the assistance of those to whom they fur- 
nished employment in exchange for services at po- 
litical primaries and conventions. 

It is somewhat interesting to follow Mr. Tweed in 
the committee rooms. " In the last Senate," says a 
brief biographical sketch, " he was a member of the 
committee on finance, charitable and religious so- 
cieties and Internal affairs of towns and counties." 
In the present Senate be is chairman of the commit- 
tee on municipal affairs and charitable and religious 
societies." The significance of these positions will 
be understood. The finance committee reports the 
supply or appropriation bill ; charitable and religious 
associations were receiving vast appropriations. Re- 
ligion was lulled to silence while Tweed was stealing 
from taxpayers. The committee on municipal affairs 
was where the famous charter was hatched. These 
committees, and those on roads and bridges, rail- 
roads, public buildings, insurance (a so-called strik- 
ing committee) and Printing, were controlled by the 
persons less -than ten in number who on each formed 
a majority. The intimate relations of these commit- 
tees to labor are immediately perceived. In the as- 
sembly, on the ways and means, canals, railroads, in- 
surance, affairs of cities and villages, charitable and 
religious societies, judiciary, and printing, ten mem 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 77 

bers held more positions than the remaining one hun- 
dred and eighteen. K. S. Randall, a man of high 
honor, who had been frequently favored by the peo- 
ple, and was once elected secretary of State, was per- 
mitted to distinguish himself as chairman of the joint 
library and public education committee. 

Thus the wants of rings were supplied through 
this corrupt legislature, and thus public patronage 
awarded to labor, under the guise of useful public im- 
provements, erected cliques in every county, which 
exerted a controlling influence in the primaries and 
conventions of both political organizations. They 
formed the foundation stone upon which rested the 
central superstructure. The same system of fraud, 
the same methods, the same policies, exerted at the 
same points, were the characteristics of the whole 
structure, and of each of its parts ; and the people 
have no more reason to trust the participants in the 
fraud than they have for trusting the chieftain. 

THE METHODS OF RINGS. 

In his lofty attitude, with the destinies of a State at 
his mercy, Mr. Tweed may be contemplated as one of the 
possibilities of a government controlled in theory by the 
popular will. At no time could he have rallied to his 
support a majority of the people of the State, or a ma- 
jority of his own political associates among the masses. 



178 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

It was only by controlling the machinery of the party 
that he could transform, by unfair processes, yet not 
necessarily illegal, a small minority of public benefi- 
ciaries into controlling agencies in command of a po- 
litical organization. Every motive which prompted the 
desire for increased power demanded also increased 
expenditure ; and the very essence and strength of 
the system was proportionate to the number of those 
who, participating in its profits, became the pillars 
which sustained it. In elections, economy is the 
principle which merits and receives public favor ; in 
the caucus, the extent of power depended upon the 
extent of patronage. 

The personal government thus established in the 
State by the seizure of the public legislature was as 
wide and powerful in influencing the action of officials 
who shared its benefits as if exercised by a man who 
possessed the authority to dismiss every public officer 
under his direction. Hitherto, the government of the 
State and counties required few public officials remov- 
able in a way lawfully prescribed. Now, new purposes 
of government were found ; methods were devised and 
put in operation by which a few controlling minds in a 
locality could seize upon the purse and credit of all ; 
thousands of new offices, disconnected with the gov- 
ernment proper and yet paid by its means, were es- 
tablished, and at the foundation of the structure, as the 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 



79 



fulcrum, were twenty thousand laborers who performed 
one duty with their shovels, and another service in 
the management of primaries under the direction of 
their employers. 

Under such an administration how impossible was 
honesty in any department ! The implied contract 
was the same to every mind which assisted the func- 
tions of government. Obedience, secrecy, fraud were 
the essentials to the preservation of power in the cen- 
tral head, and prompt retribution was certain to fol- 
low the first symptoms of resistance. Service was 
given for service, and reward followed reward. 

The means adopted to dethrone Tweed and his 
agents are no less significant than his power. The 
section of the Democratic party that opposed his de- (/ 
signs was powerless. Its adherents formed a vast 
majority even in the city, but that majority would be 
overawed by fraud in the primaries if they attempted 
to speak within the organization. Tweed, confident 
of his strength, hurled a defiance at the people and 
asked, " What are you going to do about it ? " Through 
the political machinery nothing could be done. 

There was one agency which the Tammany leader 
had overlooked. Parties and leaders had changed, the 
people were completely at his mercy, the courts were 
filled with his tools, but the law had not changed. 
Though the system was based throughout upon fraud, 



l8o THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

the moment specific acts amounting to crimes were 
discovered, the law had begun to move. The moral 
sense of the community was then aroused, and twenty- 
five thousand Democrats voting with their opponents, 
elected honest judges. The law seizing the great 
public criminals, forced some into dungeons and 
others into exile. 

The system by which the power of Tweed was at- 
tained still remains unchanged and awaits another 
agent to employ it. The subordination of State issues 
to those of a general nature, and the existence of large 
party majorities in localities, ensures to the few indi- 
viduals who gain control of a political organization, a 
power which may be perpetuated until the law steps 
in, a power which can only be preserved by feeding 
the elements which sustain it. By seizing the legisla- 
tive branch it may extend its pernicious influence in 
every section of the State, and call into being new 
forces for crippling industry by taxation, the fruits of 
which are their sustaining agencies. 

It will be discovered that all public works are sur- 
rounded by men who are known as political powers. 
The Erie canal has been managed for many years by 
a Ring, whose elements readily combined for public 
robbery. It controlled the conventions of both polit- 
ical organizations of the State. No candidate for a 
State office could disregard its influence, and its as- 



IN THE UNITED STATES. l8l 

sistance in conventions could only be purchased by 
assurances of reward out of the public purse. Its in- 
terest in the management of State affairs was vital 
and direct, and for a long time, it formed the central 
authority to which every selfish influence gave alle- 
giance. 

The capitalist in any community is almost always 
a political power. He is connected with some cor- 
poration which holds in its purse the bread of laborers ; 
he presides over a bank which controls the commer- 
cial interests of its patrons, and can withhold or dis- 
tribute its favors ; he is president of a railroad whose 
earnings are under legislative control. His interests 
are interwoven with every industry in the community. 
If disposed to use his power, his servants are of his 
own choosing ; and if they fail to discover his will, 
from a hint, others are to be found to whom they 
surrender their places. Creating the aldermen of a 
small city by controlling the primaries, holding them 
to obedience by catering to their commercial necessi- 
ties, the chartered authority given to public function- 
aries enables the account to be balanced from the 
purse of the public. 

He may be ambitious. The majority of the wards 
of a city are under his control. It forms a stock in 
trade for exchange for something else. He wants 
railroad commissioners, suited to his ambitions, and 



Io2 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

five or six wards are valuable in a political convention 
for a nominee for the office to which the appointment 
is given. He desires to raise the fare on his railroad, 
and exerts his influence to elect a legislator who will 
ask the repeal of the statutory restriction. 

The interest of those employed upon public im 
provements and their employers is identical. The 
removal of one may be the displacement of the other. 
The one gives bread and the other receives it. Their 
relations to politics are more intimate than that of 
the business man, for a change of policy may mean 
the stoppage of work. The laborer is employed by the 
contractor ; the contractor by the commissioners of 
canals ; the commissioners of canals receive their in- 
structions from the legislature. The laborer furnishes 
numbers to the primary, a little rioting and fraud ; 
the contractor directs the delegates at conventions ; 
the conventions select the commissioners; and the 
commissioners in turn employ the contractors who re- 
ward the laborers. Where the party majority is 
assured, an election will not affect the arrangement. 
If the election of other commissioners occurs, it is 
only necessary to transform the laborers into mem- 
bers of the opposite party ; to let them attend other 
caucuses, and to put the contractors into subordinate 
positions not political, to preserve the character of the 
ring. The one thousand employees at the Custom 



IN THE UNITED STATES. ^3 

House in New York city controlling the republican 
primaries, perform every function necessary to nom- 
inate their tickets, and when nominated, fifty-four 
thousand Republicans, ostracised by the disgusting 
scandals of the caucus, vote the men put in nomina- 
tion by the element whose practices drove them from 
the only place where their power could be efficiently 
employed for their own benefit.* 

* A statement of the number of beneficiaries of the govern- 
ment in New York city shows that there are 4,413 Tam- 
many office-holders, 2,165 policemen, 500 firemen, trustees 
of schools, and 5,000 to 10,000 laborers hired by contractors 
doing city work, who are all under obligations to vote the 
Tammany ticket. Against this army of men, every one of 
whom is more or less an element of aggressive strength 
to Tammany Hall, the regular Republican organization has 
been able to call for service, such as each man was able to 
render, from 900 men, night inspectors, letter carriers, etc., in 
the Federal service, and 442 holding the like small places in 
the city departments, making in all 1,342. Under the new 
order of things, the 900 Federal office-holders will not be per- 
mitted to take any part in politics in the future. Mr. Geo. 
Bliss, a prominent Republican leader in New York city, esti- 
mates that 6,000 persons are properly on the rolls of Republican 
associations in that city, representing more than 50,000 Re- 
publican voters. 



184 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

CHAPTER XL 

THE PROPOSED SYSTEM AND DEMOCRATIC 
PRINCIPLES. 

Unquestionably the establishment of this sys- 
tem would tend to destroy party prejudice and elimi- 
nate party lines. The independent voter could be- 
come an affirmative, and not as a present a negative 
force, in the government. At this time he is only 
permitted the choice between two alternatives, each 
possibly repulsive. Under such a system, in an open 
and honorable exhibition of strength, the independ- 
ent and intelligent element, representing the com- 
mercial interests of the people, would doubtless con- 
trol the country to the exclusion of all interested in- 
fluences. It remains only to examine it in its rela- 
tions to Democratic principles. 

The natural tendency of the elements composing 
the Conservative or Democratic party is to favor the 
harmonious principles of free trade, hard money, 
strict construction, local self-government, and indi- 
vidual liberty. The presence of human slavery within 
the borders of the Union, for a long period, rendered 
the question of State or local self-government the one 
of highest importance. The party representing this 
material interest of a large portion of the members of 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 185 

the organization, persistently contended for State's 
rights ; and resisted the claim of the Federal govern- 
ment to interfere with the domestic institutions of com- 
monwealths. Since the emancipation of slaves, the 
party has occupied the less objectionable position as 
the advocate of local self-government, and the friends 
of that system of policies tending to the decentralization 
of power. The process of localizing power into the 
hands of the people was thought to afford a remedy for 
the evils of the civil service, and the most recent ex- 
pressions of the Democratic Conventions would seem 
to point* to the election of national officials, operating 
within a small territory, by the people within their 
jurisdiction. 

The adoption of the principle of free trade as a 
legislative rule of action, it is claimed, would prevent 
the establishment of monopolied interests, and would 
tend to the distribution of labor in its natural chan- 
nels, where it would not be disturbed by the inter- 
ference of the legislative authority, compelled by the 
necessities of the government, to make frequent 
changes in the tariff regulations. 

The strict construction of laws would tend to pre- 
vent the building up of special internal interests with 
the assistance of the government ; and would secure 
more efficiency in its action by limiting the scope and 
number of the duties of the official servants. 



1 86 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

The advocates of hard money, and the single 
standard of gold, seek the establishment of a measure 
of values which would be undisturbed by the inter- 
ference of the Legislature of the nation, which aims 
to adapt a national currency to the wants of the coun- 
try. The productions of the people would represent 
their real value in the currency of the world, if the 
entrance of coin was unimpeded by the presence of a 
cheaper currency. The interests of monopoly and 
speculation in an unsettled currency, and the power 
of the elements controlling its values, would be sub- 
stantially nullified, by the adoption of the currency 
possessing intrinsic worth, and forcing the special in- 
terests of our nation into competition with the inter- 
ests of the civilized world. The fear of legislative 
interference with the currency, the concentration of 
capital and labor into places wherein it was forced by 
tariff regulations, and the inefficiency, dishonesty and 
extravagance of public officials, constitute the chief 
causes contributing to the present depression in busi- 
ness. 

It is an accepted principle of government that small 
bodies are most open to the influence of bribery ; and 
to human nature, as exemplied by circumstances con- 
stantly recurring, the employment of undue influences 
is not peculiarly repulsive. Each of the principles to 
which allusion has been made seeks to establish in 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 187 

the frame work of law the provisions which curtail the 
influence of agencies which may be specially benefit- 
ted by the assistance of government. An appeal in 
behalf of these interests, made directly to the reason 
of the people, would be unobjectionable, and would 
result in securing them the representation to which 
they are entitled. An appeal to the few persons, 
composing a political convention, invested with almost 
absolute power over the choice of the people, is certain 
to secure for them, a representation far greater than 
their legitimate portion. The principles of Democ- 
racy afford an indirect method of curtailing their 
influence ; but the wide scope of adminstrative and 
legislative discretion, within the law, cannot be touched. 
In this domain, the fidelity, capacity and honesty of 
public servants is of supreme importance and obedi- 
ence to the requirements of the party sense of the 
conservative organization, in respect to the leading 
principles of legislation, will not suffice to protect the 
people from the influence of special agencies which 
ask for such benefits as do not tend to arouse a uni- 
versal indignation. The special principles of a party 
may suffice to narrow the scope of legislative authority, 
but the real principles, controlling the minds of the 
individual public servants, will alone carry out the gen- 
eral rules to an application to every interest which 
seeks their favor. 



1 88 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

It is evident, too, that with the primaries of the 
Conservative organization, so constructed as to permit 
the entrance of interests repugnant to its principles, 
with its conventions irresponsible and composed of 
numbers so small as to be controlled by undue or im- 
proper influences, the perfect representation of the 
masses of its adherents is not secured, and the real 
efficacy of its professed principles is apt to be de- 
stroyed by filling its camp with enemies, invested with 
the authority to give effect to its measures and poli- 
cies. A few of the monopolies engaged in iron, 
woollen, or cotton manufacture, open to competition 
from foreign goods, have interests important enough 
in congressional legislation to warrant the expenditure 
of millions of dollars in influencing the primaries and 
conventions of either political organization, by direct 
or indirect methods. One of the Democratic senators 
from Connecticut, placed in his seat, it is said, by the 
use of means of doubtful legitimacy, represents in 
his person, interests which are utterly at war with 
the demands of Democratic policy. It is difficult 
in the State of Pennsylvania to secure a ratification of 
the real principles of the party, owing to the power 
the protective interests of that State exercise upon its 
political conventions ; and it is a remarkable fact that 
the man representing more nearly the real Conserv- 
ative tendencies of the party than any other, is a 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 89 

senator from the smallest State in the Union — a State 
having no large special interests seeking for legislative 
favors. 

What condemnation must we visit upon a party 
that professes principles seeking the destruction of 
monopolied influences while the expression of its voice 
is had through agencies peculiarly adapted to the en- 
trance of the very powers which it claims to oppose ! 

As has been shown, local self-government loses its 
vital quality under a system which arrays on opposite 
sides unequal forces. The underlying theory of this 
policy is that officials nearest to the people will be 
most responsible to them. Responsibility, which re- 
sults from a power of control possessed by the people, 
cannot be increased when officials are practically 
elected on party issues, the outgrowths of national 
action, by the dictation of the party caucus. 

The influence of the people may be employed more 
advantageously in the evenly balanced nation than in 
lesser localities whose partisan judgment is ever ex- 
pressed in the same direction. 

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS. 

In the preceding pages we have tried to traverse 
a field of political inquiry hitherto almost unexplored. 
Observers of the tendencies of political thought in this 
country, must have discovered a growing distrust of 






190 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

Republican institutions now inculcated among a large 
class of people prompt to discover the extent, but slow- 
to discover the nature of evils — a distrust which is the 
natural outgrowth of misgovernment and mal-admin- 
istration, both in the management of local and national 
concerns. Nothing is more natural than to attribute 
these ills to the form of our political structure, and to 
charge on the people a lack of capacity to perform the 
duties of self-government. 

It has been the aim of this work to show that this 
distrust is groundless, and that the evils complained 
of are not attributable to popular ignorance so much 
as to the methods by which the public voice is sought 
to be expressed. 

In the course of our inquiry we have called to rec- 
ollection the fact that the Union embodies the first 
attempt to establish a free government over a widely 
extended territory ; that representation, which was 
the principle whose application alone assured an equal 
voice to all, demanded that the delegated agents of 
the people should be selected in such a manner as to 
ensure the fullest responsibility to their constituen- 
cies. As the one and only active exercise of power 
ensured to the masses, is afforded through the ballot, 
responsibility — the corner-stone of representation — 
depends almost entirely upon the methods of election. 

The Union transformed thirteen independent 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 19,1 

sovereignties, each possessing all the attributes of 
separate nations, into one. Looking with human eyes, 
it is not unnatural that the founders of the govern- 
ment under-estimated the nature of the powers they 
were granting to the national authority, and failed to 
appreciate that new formations would supplant the 
parties and factions of the different States. In the 
election of members of the House of Representatives 
only, did the people, speaking in small districts, em- 
ploy their ballots in the choice of national officers ; 
and not until they rendered useless the electoral 
college for the purposes of its establishment, by grasp- 
ing the power of electing the chief magistrate, did 
two political parties arise as contestants for the 
patronage of the nation. 

Under the new conditions, the people have formed 
an allegiance to one or the other of these national 
organizations, an allegiance dependent upon the action 
of the central government operating only in its widest 
sphere, or as it affects the interest of every citizen 
within its boundaries. The slight changes of political 
sentiment, from year to year, disturb only the polit- 
ical balance in the nation at large, and the only vote 
that can be effective must be devoted to influence 
national policy. As the whole includes all its parts, 
these changes are insufficient to overturn parties in 

the respective States or alter their local policies ; and 

12 



I9 2 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

if majorities within them could be readily transposed, 
it would change men whose known opinions upon 
national subjects would have little to do with State 
concerns. The remedy proposed is ample to obviate 
a state of affairs like this. 

Again, in their national relations, the power of the 
people is equally important. A few national ques- 
tions, vital in their character, the citizen may reach 
through his ballot ; but he leaves unaffected by his 
influence a vast array of discretionary power however 
intelligently the franchise may be exercised. The 
duty incumbent upon him of choosing at one and the 
same time the set of principles he approves and the 
agent to whom he will confide their keeping, must be 
inadequately performed at one election, in which two 
distinct and equally important ends are sought to be 
attained. The questions of honesty and capacity, 
upon which depends the proper exercise of discretion- 
ary power, are forgotten in the heated contests in- 
volving the choice between political principles. 

It is, then, in this aspect that the machinery of 
selection, erected by political parties, becomes of the 
utmost importance, as it is the only means afforded 
to enable the people to speak as to the personal fit- 
ness of candidates. If the people are entitled to a 
voice therein, it would seem that they are entitled as 
well to the fullest protection in its exercise ; and all 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 93 

that is demanded herein, is that the paraphernalia of 
law which makes elections a fair representation of the 
public will should be thrown around the citizen in the 
caucus and convention ; and that those bodies should 
be stripped of the characteristics which render them 
the irresponsible agents of designing influences. The 
element whose interest it is to reward the statesmen 
and punish the demagogue, is the people, composing 
the whole body politic ; not the thousand agencies 
which now control political machinery by virtue of its 
irresponsible characteristics. 

A perusal of these pages, we believe, has convinced 
the thoughtful reader that this mechanism is irtterly 
unsuited to accomplish its legitimate purpose ; and is 
the main obstacle to the success of every just execu- 
tive policy affecting the civil service where it pre- 
scribes a rule that strips the legislator of the assist- 
ance he relies upon for personal advancement from 
those dependent upon his influence. It will be found 
that the machinery is a species of jugglery, peculiarly 
suited to establish the dominion of selfish elements, 
seeking the power of government ; and in every locality 
where majorities are so large as to make a nomination 
equivalent to an election, it renders the latter the 
most absurd of farces. 

With a majority expressive of the difference be- 
tween two political forces, embodying in themselves 



194 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

every shade of opinion, third parties are merely pro- 
tests against the machinery which permits their ad- 
herents no voice within those organizations represent- 
ing the issue of approval or disapproval — the yea or 
nay — of government policy. If the machinery af- 
forded a fair representation of the constituent ele- 
ments of either party, the strength of those now 
forced outside would be increased in proportion to 
the diminished number of those composing a single 
organization. Two parties are the natural outgrowths 
of every government controlled by the ballot, the 
natural vehicles through which the voice of millions 
is exerted and the formations of nature resulting from 
the efforts of the mass to speak effectively through 
the tongue of a majority. The machinery of political 
parties and the elective instrumentalities afforded by 
government, would assure the natural expression of 
the popular voice, if the former were as perfect as the 
latter. The duty of selecting political principles and 
the person who embodies them, is performed through 
these parties. With two sets of principles of ac- 
knowledged supremacy standing in hostile array, no 
duty remains for the citizen, as a member of his party, 
but that of choosing the agents, most honest and ca- 
pable, to carry them into effect. Any system erected, 
without regard to these facts, may increase the num- 
ber of parties ; but it will not affect the complex 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 195 

methods of each, nor can it enlarge the bounds of 
responsibility of officials or the capacities of the peo- 
ple. Nor will it avoid that mechanism through which 
those of common sentiments may gather to them- 
selves the greatest numbers or exert the greatest 
power. The sphere of popular influence and official 
responsibility may be enlarged by giving the masses 
control of the machinery of selection, and by no other 
method ; and this consummation maybe attained only 
by taking their sense within the political parties. 

Some of the evils of which we have treated, could 
be reformed in a measure, without a change of law ; 
but no authority is so impressive and positive as that 
which speaks in its name. Four requirements, if 
followed, would go very far in remedying the defects 
of the primary system : 

I. The employment of the list of registered voters, 
in use at elections in cities. 

II. The investment of absolute authority in the 
inspectors to preserve order and to decide upon 
the qualifications of voters by the consent of the 
caucus. 

III. Members of all parties should participate in 
the same election. 

IV. The votes of the members of one party should 
be counted separately from others. 

The police regulations of the law, which would 



I9 6 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE 

cover any meeting of citizens, if enforced by any 
authority such as inspectors, recognized by the party, 
are ample for the preservation of order. 

The contemplation of the enormous expenses of 
government, local and national, as compared to the 
trivial cost of elections, would almost persuade one 
that the expense of nominating officials by popular 
suffrage could not become an element of legitimate 
controversy. The cost of such an election through- 
out the United States would hardly exceed the pres- 
ent expense attaching to the several meetings for the 
registry of voters in the cities of the country. 

The expense of running or manipulating party ma- 
chinery comes directly from the people, chiefly through 
the high salaries established for public officers and 
the subsidies voted to corporations. Interest, com- 
pounded five times, would not equal the difference be- 
tween the amounts paid by those who contribute to 
the expenses of political organizations and the amount 
received by those individuals through the mechanism 
they pay for and control. 

The laws with reference to bribery cannot be 
contemplated without a conviction of their absurdity. 
In a city like New York, with a majority in a local 
election for one party more than all the votes of its 
opponents, the mischievous effects of bribery will 
chiefly be felt at the primaries, and not at elections. 



IN THE UNITED STATES. 1 97 

This bane of the elective franchise will not be em- 
ployed where a public sentiment is strongly opposed 
to it or where its use does not promise success. With 
the vast majority of citizens uninfluenced, in making 
a nomination within their party organizations, the 
mere suspicion of the use of such means would be 
sufficient to convince that the candidate employing 
them was unfit for official station. 

Whatever impression the reader may receive 
from perusing these pages, he will not escape the 
conviction that the present informal methods for 
the expression of the voice of immense political 
parties are unsuited to the purposes of their estab- 
lishment. In small localities, where the decision of 
a caucus may be overthrown by the active efforts of 
a few well-meaning citizens, its functions may not 
be dangerous ; but in the nation at large, in States, 
and even in counties and cities, the caucus is in- 
vincible and beyond the reach of independent en- 
deavor. The people, powerless in its presence, have 
become its impotent slaves ; and the fact that the 
possession of the suffrage is futile outside, renders 
the demand imperative for the best means for its 
exercise within the machinery of party organization. 
It is indispensable to freedom of action upon the 
part of the citizen, and may be indispensable to the 
preservation of the Republic. 



198 THE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE. 

The writer drops his pen with no feeling of satis- 
faction at a work thoroughly performed. The sub- 
ject has expanded from a few vague suggestions, 
born of sincere conviction, until a train of thought, 
blending many facts into one harmonious whole, has 
seemed to unravel some of the mysteries associated 
with our political condition. With each day bring- 
ing into view new events illustrating the principles 
advanced, the duty of filling out the outline may 
safely be left to better masters of the art of political 
science, educated by the tests of future experience. 






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